This study extends previous research that documents a stock price reaction leading accounting earnings. The primary issue is that prior studies use a naive earnings expectation model (random walk) as the benchmark for the information content of lagged returns and do not adequately address the “incremental” information content of lagged returns. This study identifies and estimates firm‐specific models of earnings to control directly for the autocorrelation in earnings. The explanatory power of lagged prices with respect to this earnings residual is investigated using both a multiple regression model of lagged returns and a multiple time‐series vector autoregressive model. In‐sample estimation of the models provides clear evidence that stock prices impound information about future earnings incremental to the information contained in historical earnings data. Holdout period analysis of the earnings forecasts from these lagged return models finds that both models outperform the naive seasonal random walk expectation, but neither model outperforms the more sophisticated Box‐Jenkins forecasts. On an individual firm basis, earnings forecasts supplemented with the lagged return data tend to be less precise than the Box‐Jenkins forecasts, but the price‐based models demonstrate an ability to rank the earnings forecast errors from the time‐series models. The analysis helps to characterize the limitations of lagged returns as a means of predicting future earnings innovations.

This study investigates whether the ability of book‐to‐market to predict returns derives from systematic errors in the market’s expectation of future earnings. We extend Beaver and Ryan (1996, 2000) by decomposing book‐to‐market into a more persistent (bias) component and a delayed recognition (lag) component. We find that both components are related to analyst expectations of future earnings, but the lag component is the dominant factor across all forecast horizons. Similarly, we find that the lag component explains most of the inverse relation between book‐to‐market and future returns. Given that lag is constructed by regressing book‐to‐market ratios on lagged price changes, our results are consistent with the lag component capturing systematic stock price reversals. We find that the components have unique relations with subsequent earnings forecast revisions, and controlling for these relations substantially mitigates the components’ ability to predict returns. Our component‐level analysis provides insight into how expected future earnings, summarized in book‐to‐market ratios help to explain this market anomaly.

Prior literature suggests that the market underreacts to the positive correlation in a typical firm's seasonal earnings changes, which leads to a post‐earnings‐announcement drift (PEAD) in prices. We examine the market reaction for a distinct set of firms whose seasonal earnings changes are uncorrelated and show that the market incorrectly assumes that the earnings changes of these firms are positively correlated. We also document that positive (negative) seasonal earnings changes in the current quarter are associated with negative (positive) abnormal returns in the next quarter. Thus, we observe a reversal of abnormal returns, consistent with a systematic overreaction to earnings, rather than the previously documented PEAD. Additional analysis indicates that financial analysts similarly overestimate the autocorrelation of these firms, although to a lesser extent. We also find that the magnitude of overestimation and the subsequent price reversal are inversely related to the richness of the information environment. Our results challenge the notion that investors recognize but consistently underestimate earnings correlation and provide a new perspective on the inability of prices to fully reflect the implications of current earnings for future earnings. That is, we show that investors predictably overestimate correlation when it is lacking, but underestimate it when it is present.

This paper examines whether industry efforts to decrease managerial discretion, increase uniformity, and improve transparency of a non-GAAP performance measure change voluntary disclosure and market perceptions. We find that the frequency of REITs meeting or beating analysts' expectations of funds from operations (FFO) decreases following explicit industry initiatives to discourage manipulation. Concurrent with this shift, we find that the information content of FFO to investors increased, particularly for firms reporting a reconciliation of FFO with GAAP earnings. We also examine firms in other industries to assess alternative explanations for these results, such as SEC intervention. Collectively, our findings suggest that industry guidance about non-GAAP performance curtailed managers' opportunistic reporting. Furthermore, the market response to FFO is consistent with investors perceiving less manipulation and greater reliability. Our evidence also supports the SEC's subsequent requirement that all non-GAAP disclosures be reconciled to the nearest GAAP measures.

The executive compensation literature presumes that shareholders offer risk‐averse managers stock options to entice them to take on more risk, resulting in riskier investment decisions and thus a greater return on investment. However, recent empirical work challenges this assumption, and theoretical research even argues that high levels of option‐based compensation for generally under‐diversified managers may actually lead to greater risk aversion . We evaluate the incentive structure of employee stock options by examining the level of R&D investment and the return on that investment conditional on the portfolio “vega,” which captures the sensitivity of option value to stock price volatility. Our results suggest that both investment in R&D and the return on R&D, as measured by future earnings and patent awards, varies concavely with vega. That is, low to moderate levels of vega correspond to increasing investment in and returns on R&D, consistent with vega inducing more profitable investments, but marginal returns decline as vega increases. Collectively, these results, bolstered by several supplemental analyses, suggest that this surprising relation between vega and risky investment is driven by greater risk aversion at higher levels of vega. Overall, our results imply that employee stock options may not always align the incentives of managers and shareholders.

Using both a market-based and an accrual-based measure of conservatism, we find that firms facing more severe conflicts over dividend policy tend to use more conservative accounting. Furthermore, we document that accounting conservatism is associated with a lower cost of debt after controlling for other determinants of firms' debt costs. Our collective evidence is consistent with the notion that accounting conservatism plays an important role in mitigating bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy, and in reducing firms' debt costs.