We examine the effects of an order cancellation fee on limit order flow and execution quality in the PHLX options market. The cancellation fee on professional order flow effectively reduces the rate at which limit orders are canceled. Whereas the cancellation fee discourages the submission of nonmarketable orders, it encourages the submission of marketable orders. Consequently, nonmarketable order fill rates increase; marketable order fill speeds decrease; and bid-ask spreads widen. We also find slight increases in both dollar volume and market share.

We study odd-lot trading and determine if an odd-lot trade results from odd-lot orders or if odd-lots are a result of orders broken into multiple trades. We confirm that odd-lot transactions contribute to price discovery. Our finding that odd-lot transactions contain substantial information is not being driven by orders that are originally larger than 100 shares and subsequently divided into odd-lot transactions. We further find that odd-lot transactions resulting from odd-lot orders add more to price discovery than odd-lot transactions resulting from orders for 100 or more shares. Additionally, we find that more price contribution occurs when non-high frequency traders trade in an odd-lot transaction.

Ellis et al. [Ellis, K., Michaely, R., O’Hara, M., 2000. The accuracy of trade classification rules: Evidence from Nasdaq. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 35 (4), 529–551] find that trade classification rules have limited success in classifying trades which execute inside the quotes. We reconfirm this result and propose an alternative algorithm to improve the classification accuracy for trades inside the quotes. This alternative algorithm improves the overall success rate for classifying trades, especially for trades that occur inside the quotes. Additionally, we show that the Lee and Ready [Lee, C., Ready, M., 1991. Inferring trade direction from intraday data. Journal of Finance 46, 733–747] and Ellis et al. (2000) trade classification algorithms provide biased estimates of the actual effective spreads and price impacts, while our algorithm provides statistically unbiased estimates of actual effective spreads and price impacts.

We examine short selling around dividend announcements and ex-dividend dates. Contrary to our initial expectation, we do not find abnormally high short-selling activity prior to announced dividend decreases, which runs counter to the argument that short sellers have the ability to acquire private information before its public dissemination. However, we find that the common negative relation between current short selling and future daily returns prior to unfavorable dividend announcements is similar to the negative relation during non-event times, suggesting that dividend announcements do not provide unusual trading opportunities for informed traders (Gonedes, 1978, and Benartzi et al., 1997). Around ex-dividend dates, we do find abnormal short selling, which may be explained by the return pattern around ex-dividend days documented by Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), who suggest that demand for a particular stock by dividend capture traders drives stock prices above their fundamental value thus providing a profitable trading opportunity for short sellers. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that both the level of short selling and the return predictability of short selling is markedly higher on and after the ex-dividend day than during non-event times.

Derrien [2005. Journal of Finance 60, 487–521] and Ljungqvist et al. [2006. Journal of Business] build upon the work of Miller [1977. Journal of Finance 32, 1151–1168] and claim that issuers and the regular customers of investment bankers benefit from the presence of sentiment investors (noise traders) in the market for an initial public offering (IPO). Thus we argue that investment bankers have an incentive to promote an IPO to induce sentiment investors into the market for it. Consistent with this motivation and these models, we expect that the promotional efforts of investment bankers should influence the compensation of investment bankers, the valuation of an IPO, its initial returns and trading, the wealth gains of insider shareholders, and the likelihood that an issuer switches investment bankers for a subsequent seasoned equity offering. Examining data for a sample of IPOs from 1993 through 2000, we find evidence consistent with these predictions and so with the proposition that an investment banker's ability to market an IPO to sentiment investors is important.

In this paper, we determine whether each bid (ask) quote reflects the trading interest of the specialist, limit order traders, or both for a sample of NYSE stocks in 1991. We then compare Nasdaq spreads with NYSE spreads that reflect the trading interest of the specialist. Our empirical results show that the average Nasdaq spread is significantly larger than the average NYSE specialist spread. We find that, on average, 49% of the difference between Nasdaq and specialist spreads is due to the differential use of even-eighth quotes between Nasdaq dealers and NYSE specialists. We also find that the NYSE specialist spread is significantly larger than the limit order spread, although NYSE specialists and limit order traders are similiar in their use of even-eighth quotes.

We examine the effect of home market short-sale constraints on securities that also trade in other countries that have more liberal short-sale rules. In particular, we focus on the case of ADRs traded in the US, as in some cases, the home markets of these ADRs prohibit short selling. We find that short sellers more heavily trade ADRs from countries where short selling is prohibited than from markets where short selling is allowed. Furthermore, we find that the greater levels of short selling in ADRs with binding home-market constraints is driven by stocks with greater dispersion of investors’ opinion, low fundamentals-to-price ratios, and recent price increases. Our results support the hypothesis that short sellers target ADRs with home market short-sale constraints because these ADRs are more often subject to temporary misvaluation.