[This study uses laboratory markets to examine how the level of market efficiency influences managers' use of reporting discretion, and how allowing reporting discretion alters market efficiency. The results show managers that incur costs make favorable information available to more investors in less efficient markets but not in more efficient markets. Although reporting discretion does not change market price levels, it causes the markets to under-react to public information, apparently because investors overestimate the degree to which a favorable (unfavorable) public signal indicates that the public signal was inflated (deflated). Managerial reporting discretion may be related to under-reactions to earnings reports, which are also public disclosures subject to manipulation by managers.]

This study examines the behavior of laboratory markets in which two uninformed marketmakers compete to trade with heterogeneously informed investors. The data provide three main results. First, marketmakers set quotes to protect against adverse selection and to control inventory. Second, when investors are 1ess well-informed, their trades are less reliable measures of their information, and marketmakers respond to those trades with greater skepticism. Third, errors in marketmakers' reactions to trades cause the time-series behavior of quotes and prices to depend on the information environment in ways beyond those captured in extant theory.

Examines how the level of market efficiency influences managers' use of reporting discretion and how allowing reporting discretion alters market efficiency. Nature of price efficiencies; Managerial reporting discretion; Market responses; Pricing errors; Manager's exercise of reporting discretion.

This study examines the behavior of laboratory markets in which two uninformed market makers compete to trade with heterogeneously informed investors. The data provide three main results. First, market makers set quotes to protect against adverse selection and to control inventory. Second, when investors are less well-informed, their trades are less reliable measures of their information, and market makers respond to those trades with greater skepticism. Third, errors in market makers' reactions to trades cause the time-series behavior of quotes and prices to depend on the information environment in ways beyond those captured in extant theory.

This study examines the behavior of laboratory markets in which two uninformed market makers compete to trade with heterogeneously informed investors. The data provide three main results. First, market makers set quotes to protect against adverse selection and to control inventory. Second, when investors are less well‐informed, their trades are less reliable measures of their information, and market makers respond to those trades with greater skepticism. Third, errors in market makers' reactions to trades cause the time‐series behavior of quotes and prices to depend on the information environment in ways beyond those captured in extant theory.

Availability of information, Market prices, Information dissemination, Disclosures