What went wrong? Why did seemingly rational, forward-looking bond investors continue to purchase Puerto Rican debt with only a modest risk premium? Why did financial markets fail to exercise market discipline and restrict capital flows to Puerto Rico? This paper examines the hypothesis that investors believed Puerto Rican debt was implicitly insured by the U.S. government by studying a rare situation where this “Treasury Put” was extinguished. The expectation of a federal bailout was perfectly reasonable given past behavior by the federal government. Evaluating the Treasury Put hypothesis with a minimal set of assumptions is possible given three unique features of the economic environment. The key feature is an exogenous “seismic shock” – the non-bailout of the city of Detroit in 2013 that effectively extinguished the Treasury Put, estimated in this paper as 350 basis points. Institutional reforms that would eliminate the Treasury Put are considered, but none are found satisfactory. How to extinguish the Treasury Put on an ongoing basis in a democratic society remains an open question.

Governance problems have a direct and immediate impact on the effective discount rate guiding investment decisions. Information from a transformed net present value rule and variation in firm-level panel data “reveal” the effective discount rate influencing investment. For the firms most likely to be affected by Jensen agency problems, investment behavior appears to be guided by discount rates less than the market rate by 350–400 basis points. This wedge is reduced for firms with a concentrated ownership structure. Firms facing free cash flow problems have a stock of fixed capital approximately 7–22% higher than would prevail under value maximizing behavior.

In a recent paper, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) introduce a new test of the Pecking Order Model. This comment shows that their elegantly simple test generates misleading inferences when evaluating plausible patterns of external financing. Our results, coupled with the power problem with the Static Tradeoff Model documented by Shyam-Sunder and Myers, indicate that their empirical evidence can evaluate neither the Pecking Order nor Static Tradeoff Models. Alternative tests are needed that can identify the determinants of capital structure and can discriminate among competing hypotheses.

The two key questions which motivate our work are: do bubbles exist (in the sense that stock market prices do not always correspond to the present value of expected future profitability) and, if bubbles exist, do they have an effect on business fixed investment? The case of Japan is particularly interesting because of the dramatic movements in the Japanese stock market and the wide perception that these were associated with a bubble. We use a variety of techniques to analyze these questions. Fist, we examine financing and investment patterns to gauge firms' reactions to the 1980s stock market run-up. Second, we test subsets of the orthogonality conditions associated with the empirical first-order conditions for fixed investment. Third, we use a linear projection to decompose stock market prices into fundamental and bubble components, allowing us to carry out parametric estimates of the effect of the bubble component on fixed investment. The data strongly suggest that there was a bubble that had an economically important statistically significant effect on business fixed investment in Japan.;

Market power exercised by firms has become central to macroeconomics. Recent theoretical work highlights the importance of the relation between market power and inflation. We examine this relation for individual firms in eleven U.S. industries. Our econometric framework exploits restrictions from dynamic theory and information from financial markets to generate quantitative evidence on the responsiveness of market power to inflation. We find that inflation usually has a positive effect on market power. This relation is heterogeneous across the eleven industries, and statistically significant positive relations are concentrated in industries with little market power.