This paper examines the impact of bank ownership on credit growth in developing countries before and during the 2008–2009 crisis. Using bank-level data for countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America, we analyze the growth of banks’ total gross loans as well as the growth of corporate, consumer, and residential mortgage loans. While domestic private banks in Eastern Europe and Latin America contracted their loan growth rates during the crisis, there are notable differences in foreign and government-owned bank credit growth across regions. In Eastern Europe, foreign bank total lending fell by more than domestic private bank credit. These results are primarily driven by reductions in corporate loans. Furthermore, government-owned banks in Eastern Europe did not act counter-cyclically. The opposite is true in Latin America, where the growth of government-owned banks’ corporate and consumer loans during the crisis exceeded that of domestic and foreign banks. Contrary to the case of foreign banks in Eastern Europe, those in Latin America did not fuel loan growth prior to the crisis. Also, there are less pronounced and robust differences in the behavior of foreign and domestic banks during the crisis in Latin America.

We assess the effect of privatization on performance in a panel of Nigerian banks for the period 1990–2001. We find evidence of performance improvement in nine banks that were privatized, which is remarkable given the inhospitable environment for true financial intermediation. Our results also suggest negative effects of the continuing minority government ownership on the performance of many Nigerian banks. Finally, our results complement aggregate indications of decreasing financial intermediation over the 1990s; banks that focused on investment in government bonds and non-lending activities enjoyed a relatively better performance.

Using a large panel dataset of Chinese industrial firms, we find that poorly performing SOEs were more likely to redistribute credit to firms with less privileged access to loans via trade credit. While that could be consistent with the efficient redistribution of credit, it is more likely that these SOEs extended trade credit to prop up faltering customers that were in arrears. By contrast, profitable private domestic firms were more likely to extend trade credit than unprofitable ones. Trade credit likely provided a substitute for loans for these firms' customers that were shut out of formal credit markets. As biases in lending become less severe, the allocation of lending became more efficient, and the amount of trade credit extended by private firms declined. Our evidence implies that redistribution of bank loans via trade was not a major contributor to China's explosive growth.

We focus on the economies of the North Atlantic Core during the 19th and early 20th centuries and find that an impressive variety of local financial institutions emerged to supply the needs of SMEs wherever there was sufficient demand for their services. Although these intermediaries had significant weaknesses, they were able to tap into local information networks and so extend credit to firms that were too young or small to secure funds from large regional or national institutions. In addition, by raising the return to savings for local households, they helped to mobilize significant new resources for economic development.

Privatization and increased foreign ownership transformed the Argentine banking sector during the 1990s. While both improved sector efficiency, there was concern that they might reduce access to credit outside of Buenos Aires. The results in this paper suggest that these fears were exaggerated. Provinces that privatized their banks suffered only temporary reductions in credit associated with cleaning the portfolio of the privatized banks. Typically, growth in lending by the privatized entity and by other banks restored credit to pre-privatization levels within a few years. In addition, increased foreign ownership coincided with more, not less, lending outside of Buenos Aires.

We examine the role of firms' government connections, defined by government intervention in CEO appointment and the status of state ownership, in determining the severity of financial constraints faced by Chinese firms. We demonstrate that government connections are associated with substantially less severe financial constraints (i.e., less reliance on internal cash flows to fund investment), and that the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flows is higher for firms that report greater obstacles to obtaining external funds. We also find that those large non-state firms with weak government connections, likely the engine for innovation in the coming years in China, are especially financially constrained, due perhaps to the formidable hold that their state rivals have on financial resources after the ‘grabbing-the-big-and-letting-go-the-small’ privatization program in China. Our empirical results suggest that government connections play an important role in explaining Chinese firms' financing conditions, and provide further evidence on the nature of the misallocation of credit by China's dominant state-owned banks.

We use data from a large survey of Chinese firms to investigate whether local government efforts to facilitate market development improve firm efficiency. Both government provision of information about products, markets, and innovation and government assistance in arranging loans are positively associated with firm efficiency, and those private firms with weak access to and knowledge of financial, input, and product markets benefit most from such assistance. These patterns are robust across multiple estimation approaches. Our examination of the determinants of local government facilitation also suggests that it gravitates toward promoting efficiency, though there are also indications that rent-seeking may play a role. Our evidence is consistent with the notion that government facilitation can help some firms overcome market failures in the early stages of a country's private sector development. Though causality is difficult to establish, we argue that changing fiscal dynamics that forced local governments to become increasingly self-reliant in generating revenue, and a government promotion system based on local economic performance, were key motivating factors for market facilitation by local government officials.

Using a sample of Chinese households, we study how a type of social capital, private social networks, affects access to credit and its implications for consumption. We find a strong and likely causal link between private social networks, use of informal credit, and household consumption. Informal credit via private social networks facilitates household consumption especially for households that experienced a recent health shock, that face financial constraints, and that do not have access to formal finance, and the effects are more pronounced in poor regions and rural areas.

Although a large and growing literature shows that privatization can improve the performance of non-financial enterprises, there is less evidence on how it affects the performance of the banking sector. This paper summarizes the results from the papers in the special issue of the Journal of Banking and Finance on bank privatization. It concludes that although bank privatization usually improves bank efficiency, gains are greater when the government fully relinquishes control, when banks are privatized to strategic investors, when foreign banks are allowed to participate in the privatization process and when the government does not restrict competition.

We explore the relationship between bank branch expansion, financial inclusion, and profitability for Equity Bank. Unlike traditional banks, including foreign and government owned banks in Kenya, Equity Bank targets less developed territories and less privileged households. Its presence increased financial inclusion by 31% of the adult population between 2006 and 2015, especially for Kenyans who were less educated, did not own their own home, and lived in less-developed areas. The bank’s business model proves to be highly effective, with branch-level profits rising in areas with a smaller number of operating banks. Overall, the growth of Equity Bank demonstrates that financial inclusion can be achieved and sustained through profitable branching and service strategies that also serve the needs of underserved regions and populations. Thus, financial inclusion need not come at the sacrifice of bank profitability.