Shantaram P. Hegde, Robert E. Miller, Market-Making in Initial Public Offerings of Common Stocks: An Empirical Analysis, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Mar., 1989), pp. 75-90

Several years ago Sharpe suggested a measure for the evaluation of portfolio performance. The measure was conceptually simple, easily calculated, and applicable to an entire investment portfolio, in contrast to the measures of Treynor and Jensen which measure only the undiversifiable risk in a portfolio. Sharpe's measure is still a frequently recommended tool for measuring portfolio performance. The measure is, however, biased. It is the purpose of this note to demonstrate the existence of the bias, indicate its size, and provide a means of correcting it.

[A theoretical model that explicitly incorporates the relation between investment banker and auditor is developed to provide a framework for testing the effect of auditor selection in the initial market for unseasoned equity issues. The theoretical model generates a number of testable propositions. Consistent with stylized facts, the theory suggests that high reputation investment bankers will more frequently use high reputation auditors, and that both investment banker and auditor reputation help to reduce underpricing. As either reputational variable increases, the model predicts that the impact of the other variable will diminish. The empirical results confirm this more complex relation. The structure of the model documented in this research may explain the difficulties of previous studies in identifying an empirical relation between auditor reputation and underpricing.]

The authors compare the relative magnitudes of the components of the bid-ask spread for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)/American Stock Exchange (AMEX) stocks to those of National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ)/National Market System (NMS) stocks. They find that the order-processing cost component is smaller, and the adverse selection component is greater, on the NYSE/AMEX trading systems than on the NASDAQ/NMS system. The inventory holding component is also greater for exchange-traded stocks than for NASDAQ/NMS stocks, but this may be attributable to differences in the characteristics of the firms whose stocks trade on the respective systems.

Dividend reductions have long been considered a “last resort” action for firm managers. Managerial reluctance to reduce dividends emanates from the view that dividend drops signal managerial pessimism regarding future earnings. Contrary to expectations, studies show that earnings rebound significantly following a dividend reduction; yet investors react negatively to the dividend-drop announcement. We present an explanation for the anomalous behavior of earnings and returns around the time of a dividend drop. Our evidence suggests that a reduction in a firm's established dividend coincides with a decrease in the value of the firm's real options. Earnings rebound following the dividend reduction due to the savings that result as the firm allows growth options to expire; however, announcement period returns suggest that investors recognize the lost value associated with the forthcoming expiration of growth options.

A theoretical model that explicitly Incorporates the relation between investment banker and auditor is developed to provide a framework for testing the effect of auditor selection in the Initial market for unseasoned equity Issues. The theoretical model generates a number of testable propositions. Consistent with stylized facts, the theory suggests that high reputation Investment bankers will more frequently use high reputation auditors, and that both Investment banker and auditor reputation help to reduce underpricing. As either reputational variable Increases, the model predicts that the Impact of the other variable will diminish. The empirical results confirm this more complex relation. The structure of the model documented in this research may explain the difficulties of previous studies in Identifying an empirical relation between auditor reputation and underpricing.

We compare the relative magnitudes of the components of the bid-ask spread for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)/American Stock Exchange (AMEX) stocks to those of National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ)/National Market System (NMS) stocks. We find that the order-processing cost component is smaller, and the adverse selection component is greater on the NYSE/AMEX trading systems than on the NASDAQ/NMS system. The inventory holding component is also greater for exchange-traded stocks than for NASDAQ/NMS stocks, but this may be attributable to differences in the characteristics of the firms whose stocks trade on the respective systems.

We compare the relative magnitudes of the components of the bid‐ask spread for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)/American Stock Exchange (AMEX) stocks to those of National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ)/National Market System (NMS) stocks. We find that the order‐processing cost component is smaller, and the adverse selection component is greater on the NYSE/AMEX trading systems than on the NASDAQ/NMS system. The inventory holding component is also greater for exchange‐traded stocks than for NASDAQ/NMS stocks, but this may be attributable to differences in the characteristics of the firms whose stocks trade on the respective systems.