Ball, Robin and Wu (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2003, this issue) investigate the relationship between accounting standards and the structure of other institutions on the attributes of the financial reporting system. They find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that beyond accounting standards, the structure of other institutions, such as incentives of preparers and auditors, enforcement mechanisms and ownership structure affects the outcome of the financial reporting system. However, interpretation of the evidence with respect to the notion of quality of the financial reporting system and the quality of accounting standards that the authors introduce is problematic.

Three alternative, but not mutually exclusive, perspectives on accounting method choice are contrasted: the opportunistic behavior, efficient contracting, and information perspectives. Much of the empirical work on accounting method choice is based on the opportunistic behavior perspective. The Malmquist and Main and Smith papers are attempts to view accounting method choice as a means of improving the monitoring capabilities of contracts which rely on accounting numbers. The papers serve as useful vehicles for illustrating the difficulties of delineating a set of maintained assumptions that result in hypotheses about how accounting method choice affects the monitoring characteristics of contracts, and distinguishing between hypotheses based on the three perspectives on accounting method choice.

In this paper, I draw parallels between the literatures on the effects of law on the financial development of countries and on the effects of accounting standards on financial reporting outcomes. My central thesis is that these literatures are complementary in terms of what they have to say about understanding the effects of law, regulations and accounting standards on economic and financial reporting outcomes. Moreover, both literatures suggest that U.S. securities laws and financial reporting standards have taken a more regulatory direction over time. I then take these themes and draw implications for the effects of the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) around the world at the time of adoption and over time.

In this paper we critically evaluate the standard-setting inferences that can be drawn from value relevance research studies that are motivated by standard setting. Our evaluation concentrates on the theories of accounting, standard setting and valuation that underlie those inferences. Unless those underlying theories are descriptive of accounting, standard setting and valuation, the value-relevance literature's reported associations between accounting numbers and common equity valuations have limited implications or inferences for standard setting; they are mere associations. We argue that the underlying theories are not descriptive and hence drawing standard-setting inferences is difficult.

In this paper, we review research into the economic consequences of voluntary and mandatory choices of accounting techniques and standards. We discuss how the predictions of extant economic consequence theories are driven by contracting and monitoring costs associated with management compensation contracts, bond covenants, regulation, and/or political visibility. We review empirical tests of economic consequence theories, categorize those tests, and discuss their strengths and weaknesses. The empirical tests reveal two systematic associations with accounting choice: size, a proxy for political visibility, and leverage, a proxy for contracting and monitoring costs of lending agreements. Interpretation of the results is difficult, due to general limitations of the tests. We conclude by suggesting some directions for future research, based on our analysis of the potential payoffs associated with different types of empirical tests.

Robert W. Holthausen, Robert E. Verrecchia, The Effect of Sequential Information Releases on the Variance of Price Changes in an Intertemporal Multi-Asset Market, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Spring, 1988), pp. 82-106

The evidence in this paper suggests that downgrades by both Moody's and Standard and Poor's are associated with negative abnormal stock returns in the two-day window beginning the day of the press release by the rating agency. Significant negative abnormal performance can still be detected after eliminating observations containing obvious concurrent (potentially contaminating) news releases. There is little evidence of abnormal performance on announcement of an upgrade. Significant abnormal returns are associated with announcements of additions to the Standard and Poor's Credit Watch List, if either a potential downgrade or a potential upgrade is indicated.

This paper contains evidence of a significant negative stock price reaction to media disclosures of ‘subject to’ qualified audit opinions. Disclosures of qualifications in the financial news media (the Wall Street Journal and the Broad Tape) are rare relative to the frequency of audit qualifications. Other studies do not detect an impact of qualified opinions on stock prices. None of the explanations for the difference in the results between this study and prior studies is consistent with the data. We are unable to draw strong inferences because we cannot identify the selection process that produces the sample of media disclosures.

We investigate whether announcements of ‘subject to’ audit opinions and disclaimers of opinions affect stock prices. The results indicate that many firms experience negative abnormal performance prior to the release of qualified opinions, and that the magnitude of prior abnormal performance differs across types of qualifications. However, there is little evidence of a stock price effect when qualifications are disclosed publicly. It is difficult to construct powerful tests of the announcement effect of a qualified opinion for three reasons. First, the announcement date of the qualification is not easily identified. Second, measuring the unanticipated component of the announcement requires a model of market expectations. Third, controls must be employed for concurrent disclosures. The problems concerning event date identification have ramifications for other accounting event studies, particularly studies of disclosures typically contained in the annual report or 10-K.