[Changes in stock prices have substantial explanatory power for U.S. investment, especially for long-term samples, and even in the presence of cash flow variables. The stock market dramatically out-performs a standard q-variable because the market-equity component of this variable is only a rough proxy for stock market value. Although the stock market did not predict accurately after the crash of October 1987, the errors were not statistically significant. Parallel relationships for Canada raise the puzzle that Canadian investment appears to react more to the U.S. stock market than to the Canadian market.]

One strand of endogenous-growth models assumes constant returns to a broad concept of capital. I extend these models to include tax-financed government services that affect production or utility. Growth and saving rates fall with an increase in utility-type expenditures; the two rates rise initially with productive government expenditures but subsequently decline. With an income tax, the decentralized choices of growth and saving are "too low," but if the production function is Cobb-Douglas, the optimizing government still satisfies a natural condition for productive efficiency. Empirical evidence across countries supports some of the hypotheses about government and growth.

Changes in stock prices have substantial explanatory power for U.S. investment, especially for long-term samples, and even in the presence of cash flow variables. The stock market dramatically outperforms a standard q-variable because the market-equity component of this variable is only a rough proxy for stock market value. Although the stock market did not predict accurately after the crash of October 1987, the errors were not statistically significant. Parallel relationships for Canada raise the puzzle that Canadian investment appears to react more to the U.S. stock market than to the Canadian market.

A new data set covers chief executive officers (CEOs) of large commercial banks over the period 1982-87. For newly hired CEOs, the elasticity of pay with respect to assets is about one-third. For continuing CEOs, the change in compensation depends on performance, as measured by stock and accounting returns. The sensitivity of pay to performance diminishes with experience, but the returns are not filtered for peer-group returns. Logit regressions relate the probability of CEO departure to age and performance, as measured by stock returns filtered for peer-group returns; CEO experience does not influence this relationship.

One strand of endogenous-growth models assumes constant returns to a broad concept of capital. I extend these models to include tax- financed government services that affect production or utility. Growth and saving rates fall with an increase in utility-type expenditures; the two rates rise initially with productive government expenditures but subsequently decline. With an income tax, the decentralized choices of growth and saving are "too low," but if the production function is Cobb-Douglas, the optimizing government still satisfies a natural condition for productive efficiency. Empirical evidence across countries supports some of the hypotheses about government and growth.