Even when only labor is scarce, the validity of a labor theory of value depends on reducing all labor to a homogeneous equivalent. The various implicit or explicit efforts of Smith, Ricardo, and Marx to do so are shown to fail on more counts than previously recognized. The labor theory is also shown to fail when laborers are not indifferent among alternative occupations.

Introduction, 198. — I. Specific tax, 198. — II. Ad valorem tax, 202. — III. Comparisons of specific and ad valorem taxes, 204. — IV. Tax burdens, 208; pure competition with pecuniary external diseconomies, 209; pure competition with real external diseconomies, 212; monopoly with fixed factor, 213; monopoly plus monopsony, 215; monopoly with other internal disecono|mies, 216; other cost and supply patterns, 217.

Introduction, 652. — I. Assumptions, 652. — II. The cost-minimizing locus, 653. — II. Relationships of the cost-minimizing and efficiency loci, 655. — IV. The interdependence of cost and demand, 656. — V. Conclusion, 658.

I. Characteristics of the game-theoretic approach, 559. — II. Theories of fixed-threat bargaining: Nach's theory, 563; the Zeuthen-Harsanyi theory, 566; Raiffa's theories, 569; a welfare theory, 572; further critique, 574. — III. Theories of variable-threat bargaining: an illustrative duopoly situation, 582; Nash's theory, 589; a Shapley theory, 593; Raiffa's theories, 594; Braithwaite's theory, 595; other theories, 597; Critical evaluation, 599. — IV. Conclusion, 602.

Three definitions of consumer's surplus, 422. — The assumption of universal independence, 422. — The "marginal-utility demand curve, " 423. — Open-topped marginal utility curves, 426. — Interpersonal and intertemporal comparisons of utility, 426. — Marshall's first version: extra expenditure, 427. — Its diagrammatic analysis, 429. — Nicholson's criticism of Marshall, 432. — Marshall's second version: the demand curve, 433. — Cannan's criticism, 435. — A necessary condition of independence, 437. — Relaxing the independence assumption: (1) One utility independent of all others, 438. — Alternative tests of independence, complementarity, competitiveness, 442. — (2) Independence between groups, 443. — (3) The case of "least independence, " 444. — Summary of basic tests, 447. — Conclusions, 448.

Harsanyi [1], after translating Zeuthen's bargaining theory [5, Ch. 4] into modern utility terms, has shown that it implies the same outcome as Nash's theory [4], namely a settlement that maximizes the product of the utility increments of the two parties. In the same paper, Harsanyi also reviewed Hicks's comparable theory [2, pp. 140-45] and found it, understandably, distinctly inferior to Zeuthen's. The context that both Zeuthen and Hicks had in mind was labor-management bargaining, where agreements and conflicts have time dimensions. Specifically in such situations, it will be suggested, it is possible to combine the central conceptions of both Zeuthen and Hicks in a composite theory that is superior to either of the separate ones. To prepare the way for the composite theory's presentation, its components will be briefly summarized.