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Surprises from Telephone Deregulation and the AT&T Divestiture

American Economic Review 1988
Undoubtedly, the greatest surprise in telephone industry deregulation has been the absence of deregulation, for the industry continues to be almost as highly regulated today as twenty years ago. Entry has been greatly liberalized in the equipment and most services markets, AT&T has been broken up, but the most important intrastate and interstate telephone services continue to be subject to formal rate regulation. Competitive entry has made this regulation more difficult, not politically less compelling. The major event in the telephone industry has not been deregulation, but divestiture. In 1984, AT&T was divested of its operating companies as the result of an historic 1982 antitrust decree. In this paper, I summarize some of the early effects of divestiture, including: (i) the virulence of the politics to keep the uneconomic subsidies that invited competitive entry in the first place, (ii) the preliminary evidence that AT&T is losing by winning and not vice versa, (iii) the new competition in equipment markets that may turn out to be more important than the recent developments in services competition, (iv) the misplaced concerns about the loss of system efficiency and service quality due to divestiture, and (v) the plight of the divested regional Bell holding companies (RBOCs).

The Cost of Automobile Safety and Emissions Regulation to the Consumer: Some Preliminary Results

American Economic Review 2018 open access
The cost of government regulation of the automobile has been the subject of heated controversy since its inception in the mid- 1960's. Much of this controversy has centered on the costs and benefits of individual regulations, but there has been little attention paid to the overall effect of emissions and safety regulation. In this paper, we attempt to measure the effect of these regulatory policies upon the consumer cost of owning and operating an automobile.

Automobile Safety Regulation and Offsetting Behavior: Some New Empirical Estimates

American Economic Review 1984
Suppose that engineers can demonstrate that air bags will reduce the risk of death in an automobile by 25 percent for any given frequency and severity of accidents. Would the installation of these devices necessarily reduce the fatality rate by 25 percent? The answer depends upon the response of drivers to the increased protection from dangerous accidents. If they increase their (speed, recklessness, driving while intoxicated, driving in unsafe conditions, etc.), they may realize substantially less than a 25 percent reduction in expected fatalities. Such offsetting behavior is not irrational: it merely represents a substitution of the marginal benefits of driving intensity for the reduced marginal cost of risk. If offsetting behavior actually occurs, it may be realized in increased risks for bicyclists, motorcyclists, and pedestrians. These externalities could be substantial unless there is a reduction in risk taking among these groups. As a result, the net effect of mandating air bags or any other safety device is far from obvious. There may be no net reduction in fatalities or serious injuries. These theoretical considerations are at the core of Sam Peltzman's classic study (1975) of automobile safety regulation. For policymakers, however, the key question is how much offsetting behavior actually occurs. As Peltzman (1977) acknowledges, offsetting behavior could be trivial or substantial. In this paper, we explore this issue, providing new empirical estimates of the effects of crashworthiness standards established for automobiles over the past fifteen years. These standards have required the installation of lapshoulder belts, energy-absorbing steering columns, head restraints, padded dashboards, crush-resistant passenger compartments, safer windshield mounting, more secure locks, and a variety of other features.