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Loyalty, Exit, and Enforcement: Evidence from a Kenya Dairy Cooperative

American Economic Review 2015 105(5), 286-290 open access
Organizations depend on members' “loyalty” for their success. Studying a cooperative's attempt to increase deliveries by members, we show that the threat of sanctions leads to highly heterogeneous response among members. Despite the cooperative not actually enforcing the threatened sanctions, positive effects for some members persist for several months. Other members “exit,” stopping delivering altogether. Among non-compliant members we document substantial heterogeneity in beliefs about the legitimacy of the sanctions. This lack of common understanding highlights the role played by managers in organizations and provides a candidate explanation for lack of sanctions enforcement documented by Ostrom (1990) and other studies.

The Value of Relationships: Evidence from a Supply Shock to Kenyan Rose Exports

American Economic Review 2015 105(9), 2911-2945 open access
This paper provides evidence on the importance of reputation in the context of the Kenyan rose export sector. A model of reputation and relational contracting is developed and tested. A seller's reputation is defined by buyer's beliefs about seller's reliability. We show that (i) due to lack of enforcement, the volume of trade is constrained by the value of the relationship; (ii) the value of the relationship increases with the age of the relationship; and (iii) during an exogenous negative supply shock deliveries are an inverted-U shaped function of relationship's age. Models exclusively focusing on enforcement or insurance considerations cannot account for the evidence.

The Market for Training Services: A Demand Experiment with Bangladeshi Garment Factories

American Economic Review 2015 105(5), 300-304 open access
We marketed a training program for lower level managers (line supervisors) to large factories in the Bangladeshi ready-made garment industry. Take-up of the program (even for a free slot) was low, due to intense production pressures, fire-fighting and concerns over retention of trained workers. Take-up is quite insensitive to pricing. There was higher interest and demand in training modules aimed at improving production processes and quality, rather than human resources and social compliance. Since the program was priced close to a commercially viable rate, it might be possible to develop a market provided they could be proved to be effective.