This paper investigates the warrant pricing abilities of dilution-adjusted versions of the Black-Scholes and Jump-Diffusion option pricing models. Because of the typically long lives of warrants, their pricing is hypothesized to benefit from use of the Jump-Diffusion model, which relaxes the Black-Scholes restriction against stock price jumps. Empirical results indicate that while the Black-Scholes model almost uniformly provides more efficient estimates, the Jump-Diffusion model generally provides less biased estimates of market value. Particularly for the valuation of out-of-the-money warrants and warrants on stocks with a history of large and/or frequent jumps, the Jump-Diffusion model may be preferred.

Several studies indicate the presence of large abnormal returns accruing to shareholders of merged firms in the period immediately before the merger. For example, Mandelker [18] reports that stockholders of acquired firms earn abnormal returns of approximately 14 percent in the seven months preceding merger. Franks, Broyles, and Hecht [15] find abnormal returns of 26 percent for British firms during the four months prior to merger; Elgers and Clark [11] report 43 percent abnormal returns accruing over two years before merger to shareholders of acquired firms.

Rodney L. Roenfeldt, Gary L. Griepentrog, Christopher C. Pflaum, Further Evidence on the Stationarity of Beta Coefficients, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Mar., 1978), pp. 117-121

Equity valuation effects of decisions by corporations to shift assets to master limited partnerships (MLPs) are examined for the period 1982–1987. Positive average abnormal returns are found for (1) total conversions of corporations to MLPs (5.89%), (2) rollouts of subsets of assets by distribution of MLP equity claims to parent-firm shareholders (6.41%), and (3) rollouts of subsets of assets by public sale of MLP equity claims (2.41%). The positive effects are consistent with tax advantages, reduction in free cash flow, and information signaling. The positive effects for rollouts of subsets of assets are also consistent with reductions in information asymmetry and improvements in asset management.

Claims ultimately awarded to shareholders of firms in reorganization were examined for a sample of 30 filings under the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act. We measured the amount paid to shareholders in excess of that which they would have received under the absolute priority rule and found that this amount represents, on average, 7.6% of the total awarded to all claimants. Evidence is also reported that common share values reflect a significant proportion of value ultimately received in violation of absolute priority, suggesting that deviations from the rule were expected by the equity markets.

Claims ultimately awarded to shareholders of firms in reorganization were examined for a sample of thirty filings under the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act. The authors measured the amount paid to shareholders in excess of that which they would have received under the absolute priority rule and found that this amount represents, on average, 7.6 percent of the total awarded to all claimants. Evidence is also reported that common share values reflect a significant proportion of value ultimately received in violation of absolute priority, suggesting that deviations from the rule were expected by the equity markets.