Abstract This paper finds that declining bank equity or liquidity reduces liquidation values of bank-owned real estate and accelerates the pace of asset sales. Buyers of these assets earn significant returns for providing liquidity to banks, as prices tend to rebound sharply after sales by illiquid banks. Lower liquidation values also depress the prices of nearby real estate transactions. Policy interventions, such as equity injections and central bank asset purchases, increase liquidation values by providing institutions with the balance sheet capacity to slow asset sales. This evidence suggests that balance sheet adjustments at financial institutions can explain real asset price dynamics. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract This paper finds that banks and nonbanks respond differently to increased competition in consumer credit markets. Increased competition and a greater threat of failure induces banks to specialize in relationship business lending, and surviving banks are more profitable. However, nonbanks change their credit policy when faced with more competition and expand credit to riskier borrowers at the extensive margin, resulting in higher default rates. These results show how the effects of competition depend on the form of intermediation. They also suggest that increased competition can cause credit risk to migrate outside the traditional supervisory umbrella.