Open-end equity funds provide a diversified equity positions with little direct cost to investors for liquidity. This study documents a statistically significant indirect cost in the form of a negative relation between a fund's abnormal return and investor flows. Controlling for this indirect cost of liquidity changes the average fund's abnormal return (net of expenses) from a statistically significant −1.6% per year to a statistically insignificant −0.2% and also fully explains the negative market-timing performance found in this and other studies of mutual fund returns. Thus, the common finding of negative return performance at open-end mutual funds is attributable to the costs of liquidity-motivated trading.

When a collection of specialists organize as an exchange, each can reap net private benefits at the expense of the exchange by quoting a privately optimal pricing schedule. Coordination makes all specialists and customers better off, but requires a system of monitoring and punishment that breaks down when information asymmetries between the exchange and a specialist are high. The specialist may then seek a temporary trading halt to alleviate unjustified punishment, or the exchange may halt trading to prevent the quoting of damaging privately optimal pricing schedules. We test this theory on a sample of NYSE halts. As predicted, we find a significant increase in estimated information asymmetry immediately preceding trading halts.

When a collection of specialists organize as an exchange, each can reap net private benefits at the expense of the exchange by quoting a privately optimal pricing schedule. Coordination makes all specialists and customers better off, but requires a system of monitoring and punishment that breaks down when information asymmetries between the exchange and a specialist are high. The specialist may then seek a temporary trading halt to alleviate unjustified punishment, or the exchange may halt trading to prevent the quoting of damaging privately optimal pricing schedules. We test this theory on a sample of NYSE halts. As predicted, we find a significant increase in estimated information asymmetry immediately preceding trading halts.

Institutional trading arrangements often involve the portfolio manager delegating the task of trade execution to a separate division within the firm. We model the agency conflict that arises in this setting and show that optimal performance benchmarks often create an incentive to execute orders contrary to concurrent information flow. We hypothesize that aggregate contrarian trading resulting from widespread application of such benchmarks leads to delays in the assimilation of information in security prices. Using institutional trading data, we document the hypothesized contrarian trading pattern and relate the pattern to price-adjustment delays in the response of individual stocks to index futures returns. The evidence supports the assertion that delegated institutional trading contributes to these delays.

We study the relation between market returns and aggregate flow into U.S. equity funds, using daily flow data. The concurrent daily relation is positive. Our tests show that this concurrent relation reflects flow and institutional trading affecting returns. This daily relation is similar in magnitude to the price impact reported for an individual institution's trades in a stock. Aggregate flow also follows market returns with a one-day lag. The lagged response of flow suggests either a common response of both returns and flow to new information, or positive feedback trading.

ABSTRACT Economic distortions can arise when financial claims trade at prices set by an intermediary rather than direct negotiation between principals. We demonstrate the problem in a specific context, the exchange of open‐end mutual fund shares. Mutual funds typically set fund share price (NAV) using an algorithm that fails to account for nonsynchronous trading in the fund's underlying securities. This results in predictable changes in NAV, which lead to exploitable trading opportunities. A modification to the pricing algorithm that corrects for nonsynchronous trading eliminates much of the predictability. However, there are many other potential sources of distortion when intermediaries set prices.

We study the impact of disclosure and inattention on the decision to retain fee-based financial advice using a two-tiered natural regulatory experiment. Increased salience in fee disclosure raises the drop rate for advice, implying improved attention — particularly for relatively sophisticated investors. However, a novel auto-drop requirement for inattentive investors generates far more drops, implying limited attention despite salient disclosure — particularly for the unsophisticated. Contrary to studies of commission-based advice, we find that investors benefit from fee-based advice. Benefits are higher for less sophisticated investors, who tend to be detrimentally auto-dropped. Drops triggered by salient disclosure tend to be beneficial.

We examine institutional demand prior to well-known stock return anomalies and find that institutions have a strong tendency to buy stocks classified as overvalued (short leg of anomaly), and that these stocks have particularly negative ex post abnormal returns. Our results differ from numerous studies documenting a positive relation between institutional demand and future returns. We trace the difference to measurement horizon. We too find a positive relation at a quarterly horizon. However, the relation turns strongly negative at the one-year horizon used in anomaly studies. We consider several explanations for institutions’ tendency to trade contrary to anomaly prescriptions. Our evidence largely rules out explanations based on flow and limits-of-arbitrage, but is more consistent with agency-induced preferences for stock characteristics that relate to poor long-run performance.

This study provides empirical evidence on the role of disclosure in resolving agency conflicts in delegated investment management. For certain expenditures, fund managers have alternative means of payment which differ greatly in their opacity: payments can be expensed (relatively transparent); or bundled with brokerage commissions (relatively opaque). We find that the return impact of opaque payments is significantly more negative than that of transparent payments. Moreover, we find a differential flow reaction that confirms the opacity of commission bundling. Collectively, our results demonstrate the importance of transparency in addressing agency costs of delegated investment management.

Several theoretical studies suggest that coordination problems can cause arbitrageur crowding to push asset prices beyond fundamental value as investors feedback trade on each others’ demands. Using this logic, we develop a crowding model for momentum returns that predicts tail risk when arbitrageurs ignore feedback effects. However, crowding does not generate tail risk when arbitrageurs rationally condition on feedback. Consistent with rational demands, our empirical analysis generally finds a negative relation between crowding proxies constructed from institutional holdings and expected crash risk. Thus our analysis casts both theoretical and empirical doubt on crowding as a stand-alone source of tail risk.