I examine the ability of the U.S. investor protection regime to limit insider trading returns, absent Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the short-swing rule). I find that in this setting, U.S. insiders execute short-swing trades that i) beat the market by approximately 15 basis points per day and ii) systematically divest ahead of disappointing earnings announcements. These results indicate that the bright-line rule restricting short-horizon round-trip insider trading plays a substantial role in protecting outside investors from privately informed insiders in the United States.

We examine the influence of mobile communication on local information flow and local investor activity using the enforcement of statewide distracted driving restrictions, which are exogenous events that constrain mobile communication while driving. By restricting mobile communication across a potentially sizable set of local individuals, these restrictions could inhibit local information flow and, in turn, the market activity of stocks headquartered in enforcement states. We first document a decline in Google search activity for local stocks when restrictions take effect, suggesting that constraints on mobile communication significantly affect individuals’ information search activity. We further find significant declines in local trading volume when restrictions are enforced. This drop in liquidity is (1) attenuated when laws provide substitutive means of mobile communication and (2) magnified when locals have long car commutes and when their daily commutes overlap with regular exchange hours. Moreover, trading volume suffers the most for local stocks with lower institutional ownership, less analyst coverage, and more intangible information. Additional analyses show lower intraday volume during local commute times when mobile connectivity is constrained. Together, our results suggest that local information and local investors matter in stock markets and that mobile communication is an important mechanism through which these elements operate to affect liquidity and price discovery.

Media as a whole has been shown to play an important role as an information source, information intermediary, and monitor of public firms, but much less is known about whether local newspapers play a similar role. We attempt to shed light on this issue, and we investigate if and how firms respond to changes in the local newspaper industry, where closures and layoffs have become the norm. Compared to a sample of matched control firms, we find that following newspaper closures and large industry layoffs, nearby public companies boost dividend payouts. This result follows from prior research suggesting that investors pressure managers to increase dividends in response to growing agency problems. Cross-sectional analyses confirm that our results are driven by geographically-concentrated firms that rely more heavily on local newspapers as a monitor and information source. Our findings suggest that local newspapers play an important role as an information intermediary and monitor of public firms, and that the disappearance of local newspapers exacerbates agency problems in nearby firms that tend to be remedied by higher dividends.

We study the New York City taxi market to examine whether an excise tax hike on cigarettes corresponds to smoker taxi drivers more frequently cheating their customers. Increased cheating could be motivated by both financial pressures and as a reaction to unfair treatment (as surveyed smokers view cigarette tax hikes as quite unfair). We examine this question using detailed ride-level data where we can identify a rare but fraudulent overcharging technique (cheating) and a subsample of taxi drivers who smoke (affected taxpayers, identified via tickets for smoking in a cab). In difference-in-differences regressions we find that following a cigarette tax hike, taxi drivers who smoke are approximately 1.5 times more likely to cheat customers than other drivers. Our findings are strongest in the subsample of smokers with consistently low earnings.

We examine whether the local administration of sales taxes (as opposed to a more streamlined state administration) affects the real economy for businesses complying with the tax. We study this question in the Florida hotel industry, as counties in Florida can choose to locally administer the county‐level tourist tax or have the state administer the county‐level tax along with the state‐level tourist tax. Local administration is popular because it supports local employment (of tax administrators) and provides more stringent enforcement on non‐commercial operators (e.g., private rentals). State administration, however, has fewer compliance costs for hotels (e.g., reduced filings and fewer audits). Commentary from the profession suggests the incremental compliance costs of local administration can be considerable. We find that counties switching from state to local administration of tourist taxes is associated with slower growth in aggregate hotel payroll and employment, consistent with local tax administration increasing compliance costs to the point that affected businesses cut other services.

The growing popularity of home-sharing platforms such as Airbnb, partly fueled by hosts’ ability to evade local taxes and regulations, has been shown to elevate housing costs by reallocating long-term housing units to the short-term rental market. This study assesses whether enhanced tax enforcement can mitigate this trend. We analyze staggered tax collection agreements between Airbnb and Florida counties, wherein Airbnb collects taxes from the hosts directly. Using a difference-in-differences methodology, we find these agreements significantly slow the growth of housing costs, highlighting the importance of tax policy in addressing the sharing economy’s influence on housing affordability.