We empirically examine how systemic risk in the banking sector leads to correlated risk in office markets of global financial centers. In so doing, we compute an aggregated measure of systemic risk in financial centers as the cumulated expected capital shortfall of local financial institutions. Our identification strategy is based on a double counterfactual approach by comparing normal with financial distress periods as well as office with retail markets. We find that office market interconnectedness arises from systemic risk during financial turmoil periods. Office market performance in a financial center is affected by returns of systemically linked financial center office markets only during a systemic banking crisis. In contrast, there is no evidence of correlated risk during normal times and among the within-city counterfactual retail sector. The decline in office market returns during a banking crisis is larger in financial centers compared to non-financial centers.

In this paper, we investigate the role of educational ties in private equity. Although we cannot observe all the funds that bid for a target company, we construct the set of potential bidders based upon their size and investment cycle, as well as the location and sector of their target companies. By gathering detailed educational histories of fund partners and CEOs of target firms, we find a significantly higher incidence of educational ties in completed deals than exists among the set of potential bidders. We argue that educational ties between fund managers and CEOs of target companies play a (positive) role in sourcing deals and winning competitive transactions. The alma maters of CEOs and private equity partners are notably concentrated among the top universities, and we find that exclusivity of educational ties is important. However, we find no evidence that such educational ties produce higher returns for investors.