[We develop a new method for measuring moment risk premiums. We find that the skew premium accounts for over 40% of the slope in the implied volatility curve in the S&P 500 market. Skew risk is tightly related to variance risk, in the sense that strategies designed to capture the one and hedge out exposure to the other earn an insignificant risk premium. This provides a new testable restriction for asset pricing models trying to capture, in particular, disaster risk premiums. We base our results on a general trading strategy by replicating contracts that swap implied for realized conditional asset moments.]

We consider a model of external financing in which entrepreneurs are privately informed about the quality of their projects and seek funds from competitive financiers. The literature restricts attention to monotonic, or “manipulation proof,” securities and finds that straight debt is the uniquely optimal contract. Monotonicity is commonly justified by the argument that it would endogenously arise if the entrepreneur can window dress the realized earnings before contract maturity. We explicitly characterize the optimal contracts when entrepreneurs engage in window dressing and/or output diversion and derive necessary and sufficient conditions for straight debt to be optimal. Contrary to conventional wisdom, debt is often suboptimal, and it is never uniquely optimal. Optimal contracts are nonmonotonic and induce profit manipulation in equilibrium. They can be implemented as performance-sensitive debt. Received: March 24, 2018; Editorial decision September 22, 2018 Editor: Uday Rajan

Short-lived arbitrage opportunities arise when prices adjust with a lag to new information. They are toxic because they expose dealers to the risk of trading at stale quotes. Hence, theory implies that more frequent toxic arbitrage opportunities and faster responses to these opportunities should impair liquidity. We provide supporting evidence using data on triangular arbitrage. As predicted, illiquidity is higher on days when the fraction of toxic arbitrage opportunities and arbitrageurs' relative speed are higher. Overall, our findings suggest that the price efficiency gain of high-frequency arbitrage comes at the cost of increased adverse selection risk.

This paper studies asymmetric profitability of the momentum trading strategy. When investors face Knightian uncertainty, they react differently to past winners and losers, which creates asymmetric patterns in price continuations. This asymmetry increases with the level of market and idiosyncratic uncertainty relating to the fundamental value of stocks. We provide a model explaining this phenomenon and empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis. Our results also imply that momentum is more likely to continue for downward trends in a highly uncertain market.

We show short selling in corporate bonds forecasts future bond returns. Short selling predicts bond returns where private information is more likely, in high-yield bonds, particularly after Lehman Brothers’ collapse of 2008. Short selling predicts returns following both high and low past bond returns. This, together with short selling increasing following past buying order imbalances, suggests short sellers trade against price pressures as well as trade on information. Short selling predicts bond returns both in the individual bonds that are shorted and in other bonds by the same issuer. Past stock returns and short selling in stocks predict bond returns but do not eliminate bond short selling predicting bond returns. Bond short selling does not predict the issuer’s stock returns. These results show bond short sellers contribute to efficient bond prices and that short sellers’ information flows from stocks to bonds but not from bonds to stocks.

We study the information content of corporate insiders’ trades after earnings announcements. We find little evidence that insiders trade on foreknowledge of material information in the post-SOX period. Conditioning on short-selling activity as a proxy for demand of arbitrageurs who exploit short-term mispricing, we show that insiders profit from selling because of their ability to exploit short-term mispricing after earnings releases. In contrast before SOX, insiders do take advantage of foreknowledge of material information while selling. Insider purchases are based on foreknowledge of material information both before and after SOX, but they are rare and have small economic magnitude.

Short-lived arbitrage opportunities arise when prices adjust with a lag to new information. They are toxic because they expose dealers to the risk of trading at stale quotes. Hence, theory implies that more frequent toxic arbitrage opportunities and faster responses to these opportunities should impair liquidity. We provide supporting evidence using data on triangular arbitrage. As predicted, illiquidity is higher on days when the fraction of toxic arbitrage opportunities and arbitrageurs’ relative speed are higher. Overall, our findings suggest that the price efficiency gain of high-frequency arbitrage comes at the cost of increased adverse selection risk. Received March 25, 2015; editorial decision September 21, 2016 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

We develop a new method for measuring moment risk premiums. We find that the skew premium accounts for over 40% of the slope in the implied volatility curve in the S&P 500 market. Skew risk is tightly related to variance risk, in the sense that strategies designed to capture the one and hedge out exposure to the other earn an insignificant risk premium. This provides a new testable restriction for asset pricing models trying to capture, in particular, disaster risk premiums. We base our results on a general trading strategy by replicating contracts that swap implied for realized conditional asset moments.

We identify a global risk factor in the cross-section of implied volatility returns in currency markets. A zero-cost strategy that buys forward volatility agreements with downward sloping implied volatility curves and sells those with upward slopes–a volatility carry strategy–generates significant excess returns. The covariation with volatility carry returns fully explains the cross-sectional variation of our slope-sorted portfolios. The lower the slope, the more the forward volatility agreement is exposed to volatility carry risk.