A game theoretic model of the relationship between an information evaluator and a decision maker is formulated, and interdependence analysis is employed to decompose the game into several components. Each of these components represents one aspect of the interdependence relationship experienced by the information evaluator and decision maker. The analysis is then employed to distinguish among game forms. Résumé. Un modèle de la théorie des jeux établissant une relation entre un évaluateur d'informations et un décideur est proposé, et l'analyse d'interdépendance est utilisée afin de décomposer le jeu en plusieurs parties. Chacune de ces composantes représente une facette de la relation d'interdépendance vécue par l‘évaluateur d'informations et le décideur. Par la suite, l'analyse sert à établir une distinction parmi les “formes de jeu”.
[The economic theory of the firm suggests that a profit-maximizing product price may be determined by equating marginal cost and marginal revenue. Yet recent surveys suggest that most firms use cost-based pricing strategies where product costs are determined using absorption costing. Lere [1986] has drawn upon the economic theory of the firm, as well as extensive work on heuristic decision processes, to develop an empirically testable theory of product pricing based on accounting costs. This paper reports the results of an experiment in which Lere's theory was empirically tested.]
The economic theory of the firm suggests that a profit-maximizing product price may be determined by equating marginal cost and marginal revenue. Yet recent surveys suggest that most firms use cost-based pricing strategies where product costs are determined using absorption costing. Lere [1986] has drawn upon the economic theory of the firm, as well as extensive work on heuristic decision processes, to develop an empirically testable theory of product pricing based on accounting costs. This paper reports the results of an experiment in which Lere's theory was empirically tested.