We investigate the effect of asymmetric information on prices and liquidity by analyzing trades, quotes, spreads, and depths. Information content should increase with trade size and the information asymmetry of the trading period. Results show that price and liquidity effects are significantly associated with information content as measured by both trade size and timing relative to information events. Results are stronger for purchases than sales. Quoted prices are better measures of information effects than transaction prices, because they control for bid-ask bounce. Finally, trades that a priori contain no information have no impact on prices and liquidity, despite their large size.

We investigate the effect of asymmetric information on prices and liquidity by analyzing trades, quotes, spreads, and depths. Information content should increase with trade size and the information asymmetry of the trading period. Results show that price and liquidity effects are significantly associated with information content as measured by both trade size and timing relative to information events. Results are stronger for purchases than sales. Quoted prices are better measures of information effects than transaction prices, because they control for bid-ask bounce. Finally, trades that a priori contain no information have no impact on prices and liquidity, despite their large size.

Katrina Ellis, Roni Michaely, Maureen O'Hara, The Accuracy of Trade Classification Rules: Evidence from Nasdaq, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Dec., 2000), pp. 529-551

This paper examines aftermarket trading of underwriters and unaffiliated market makers in the three‐month period after an IPO. We find that the lead underwriter is always the dominant market maker; he takes substantial inventory positions in the aftermarket trading, and co‐managers play a negligible role in aftermarket trading. The lead underwriter engages in stabilization activity for less successful IPOs, and uses the overallotment option to reduce his inventory risk. Compensation to the underwriter arises primarily from fees, but aftermarket trading does generate positive profits, which are positively related to the degree of underpricing.