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Taxation and Dividend Policy: The Muting Effect of Agency Issues and Shareholder Conflicts

Review of Financial Studies 2017 30(9), 3176-3222
Using proprietary data on the entire spectrum of ownership structure and exact tax status of investors and firms, we examine how dividend taxation affects payout. Utilizing an exogenous shock to dividend taxation, we show that absent any frictions, dividend taxation has a large impact on payout. As agency issues and shareholder conflicts increase, owners' tax preferences have significantly smaller impact on payout. Three mechanisms reduce the dividend-tax sensitivity: Coordination among owners, heterogeneity in tax preferences, and diverging objectives between managers and owners. Altogether, taxation has a first-order impact on payout, but agency issues and shareholder conflicts mute its impact substantially.

Taxation and Dividend Policy: The Muting Effect of Agency Issues and Shareholder Conflicts

Review of Financial Studies 2017 30(9), 3176-3222
Using proprietary data on the entire spectrum of ownership structure and exact tax status of investors and firms, we examine how dividend taxation affects payout. Utilizing an exogenous shock to dividend taxation, we show that absent any frictions, dividend taxation has a large impact on payout. As agency issues and shareholder conflicts increase, owners’ tax preferences have significantly smaller impact on payout. Three mechanisms reduce the dividend-tax sensitivity: Coordination among owners, heterogeneity in tax preferences, and diverging objectives between managers and owners. Altogether, taxation has a first-order impact on payout, but agency issues and shareholder conflicts mute its impact substantially.Received June 20, 2016; editorial decision January 24, 2017 by Editor Francesca Cornelli.

Does the Scope of the Sell‐Side Analyst Industry Matter? An Examination of Bias, Accuracy, and Information Content of Analyst Reports

Journal of Finance 2017 72(3), 1285-1334
ABSTRACT We examine changes in the scope of the sell‐side analyst industry and whether these changes impact information dissemination and the quality of analysts’ reports. Our findings suggest that changes in the number of analysts covering an industry impact analyst competition and have significant spillover effects on other analysts’ forecast accuracy, bias, report informativeness, and effort. These spillover industry effects are incremental to the effects of firm level changes in analyst coverage. Overall, a more significant sell‐side analyst industry presence has positive externalities that can result in better functioning capital markets.