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Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study

American Economic Review 2007
Consider the following game: a large number of players have to state simultaneously a number in the closed interval [0, 100]. The winner is the person whose chosen number is closest to the mean of all chosen numbers multiplied by a parameter p, where p is a predetermined positive parameter of the game; p is common knowledge. The payoff to the winner is a fixed amount, which is independent of the stated number and p. If there is a tie, the prize is divided equally among the winners. The other players whose chosen numbers are further away receive nothing.' The game is played for four rounds by the same group of players. After each round, all chosen numbers, the mean, p times the mean, the winning numbers, and the payoffs are presented to the subjects. For 0 c p < 1, there exists only one Nash equilibrium: all players announce zero. Also for the repeated supergame, all Nash equilibria induce the same announcements and payoffs as in the one-shot game. Thus, game theory predicts an unambiguous outcome. The structure of the game is favorable for investigating whether and how a player's mental process incorporates the behavior of the other players in conscious reasoning. An explanation proposed, for out-of-equilibrium behavior involves subjects engaging in a finite depth of reasoning on players' beliefs about one another. In the simplest case, a player selects a strategy at random without forming beliefs or picks a number that is salient to him (zero-order belief). A somewhat more sophisticated player forms first-order beliefs on the behavior of the other players. He thinks that others select a number at random, and he chooses his best response to this belief. Or he forms second-order beliefs on the first-order beliefs of the others and maybe nth order beliefs about the (n I )th order beliefs of the others, but only up to a finite n, called the ndepth of reasoning. The idea that players employ finite depths of reasoning has been studied by various theorists (see e.g., Kenneth Binmore, 1987, 1988; Reinhard Selten, 1991; Robert Aumann, 1992; Michael Bacharach, 1992; Cristina Bicchieri, 1993; Dale 0. Stahl, 1993). There is also the famous discussion of newspaper competitions by John M. Keynes (1936 p. 156) who describes the mental process of competitors confronted with picking the face that is closest to the mean preference of all competitors.2 Keynes's game, which he considered a Gedankenexperiment, has p = 1. However, with p = 1, one cannot distinguish between different steps of reasoning by actual subjects in an experiment. There are some experimental studies in which reasoning processes have been analyzed in ways similar to the analysis in this paper. Judith Mehta et al. (1994), who studied behavior in two-person coordination games, suggest that players coordinate by either applying depth of reasoning of order I or by picking a focal point (Thomas C. Schelling, 1964), which they call Schelling salience. Stahl and Paul W. Wilson (1994) analyzed behavior in symmetric 3 x 3 games and concluded that subjects were using depths of reasoning of orders 1 or 2 or a Nash-equilibrium strategy. * Department of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Balmes 132, Barcelona 08008, Spain. Financial support from Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) through Sonderforschungsbereich 303 and a postdoctoral fellowship from the University of Pittsburgh are gratefully acknowledged. I thank Reinhard Selten, Dieter Balkenborg, Ken Binmore, John Duffy, Michael Mitzkewitz, Alvin Roth, Karim Sadrieh, Chris Starmer, and two anonymous referees for helpful discussions and comments. I learned about the guessing game in a game-theory class given by Roger Guesnerie, who used the game as a demonstration experiment. 'The game is mentioned, for example, by Herve Moulin (1986), as an example to explain rationalizability, and by Mario H. Simonsen (1988). 2 This metaphor is frequently mentioned in the macroeconomic literature (see e.g., Roman Frydman, 1982).

Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games

Review of Economic Studies 2009 76(1), 181-221
This paper proposes a method to measure strategic uncertainty by eliciting certainty equivalents analogous to measuring risk attitudes in lotteries. We apply this method by conducting experiments on a class of one-shot coordination games with strategic complementarities and choices between simple lotteries and sure payoff alternatives, both framed in a similar way. Despite the multiplicity of equilibria in the coordination games, aggregate behaviour is fairly predictable. The pure or mixed Nash equilibria cannot describe subjects' behaviour. We present two global games with private information about monetary payoffs and about risk aversion. While previous literature treats the parameters of a global game as given, we estimate them and show that both models describe observed behaviour well. The global-game selection for vanishing noise of private signals offers a good recommendation for actual players, given the observed distribution of actions. We also deduce subjective beliefs and compare them with objective probabilities.

The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information

Econometrica 2004 72(5), 1583-1599
The theory of global games has shown that coordination games with multiple equilibria may have a unique equilibrium if certain parameters of the payoff function are private information instead of common knowledge. We report the results of an experiment designed to test the predictions of this theory. Comparing sessions with common and private information, we observe only small differences in behavior. For common information, subjects coordinate on threshold strategies that deviate from the global game solution towards the payoff-dominant equilibrium. For private information, thresholds are closer to the global game solution than for common information. Variations in the payoff function affect behavior as predicted by comparative statics of the global game solution. Predictability of coordination points is about the same for both information conditions.

Search Dynamics in Consumer Choice under Time Pressure: An Eye-Tracking Study

American Economic Review 2011 101(2), 900-926
We study decisions that involve choosing between different numbers of options under time pressure using eye-tracking to monitor the search process of the subjects. We find that subjects are quite adept at optimizing within the set of items that they see, that the initial search process is random in value, that subjects use a stopping rule to terminate the search process that combines features of optimal search and satisficing, and that subjects search more often in certain focal regions of the display, which leads to choice biases.