A prominent motive for corporate venture capital (CVC) is the identification of entrepreneurial-firm acquisition opportunities. Consistent with this view, we find that one of every five startups purchased by 61 top corporate investors from 1987 through 2003 is a venture portfolio company of its acquirer. Surprisingly, our analysis reveals that takeovers of portfolio companies destroy significant value for shareholders of acquisitive CVC investors, even though these same investors are “good acquirers” of other entrepreneurial firms. We explore numerous explanations for these puzzling findings, which seem rooted in managerial overconfidence or agency problems at the program level.

ABSTRACT U.S. multinational corporations increasingly use intra‐firm, cross‐border research collaboration to disperse R&D across different countries. This paper investigates the implications of such collaboration on the abilities of firms to garner benefits from R&D tax incentives. We find that the association between R&D intensity and tax incentives is three to five times larger when firms have extensive cross‐border collaboration connected to a country. We also find that the effect is stronger when local intellectual property protection is weaker and when local innovation resources are higher. Our results suggest that cross‐border collaboration helps firms achieve more tax‐efficient R&D investments both by reducing the nontax frictions posed by weak intellectual property protection and by increasing the nontax benefits of foreign R&D.

We explore the market for lending to start-ups and two mechanisms that facilitate trade within it: (1) the salability of patent collateral and (2) the credible commitment of equity investors. Intensified trading in the secondary patent market is strongly related to lending, particularly for start-ups with more redeployable patent assets. Utilizing the crash of 2000 as a severe and unexpected capital supply shock for venture capitalists, we further show that lenders continue to finance start-ups with recently funded investors better able to credibly commit to refinance their portfolio companies while withdrawing from otherwise promising projects that could have needed their funds the most.