We examine the relationship between firm performance and corporate governance in microfinance institutions (MFI) using a self-constructed global dataset on MFIs collected from third-party rating agencies. Using random effects panel data estimations, we study the effects of board and CEO characteristics, firm ownership type, customer-firm relationship, and competition and regulation on an MFI’s financial performance and outreach to poor clients. We find that financial performance improves with local rather than international directors, an internal board auditor, and a female CEO. The number of credit clients increase with CEO/chairman duality. Outreach is lower in the case of lending to individuals than in the case of group lending. We find no difference between non-profit organisations and shareholder firms in financial performance and outreach, and we find that bank regulation has no effect. The results underline the need for an industry specific approach to MFI governance.

We evaluate the efficiency of microfinance institutions (MFIs) using a structural approach which also captures these institutions’ outreach and sustainability objectives. We estimate economies of scale and input price elasticities for lending-only and deposit-mobilizing MFIs using a large sample of high-quality panel data. The results confirm conjectures that improvements in efficiency can come from the growth or consolidations of MFIs, as we find substantial increasing returns to scale for all but profitability-focused deposit-mobilizing MFIs. Our results support the existence of a trade-off between outreach and sustainability. All inputs are inelastic substitutes, but we find differences in own-price elasticities in lending-only and deposit-mobilizing MFIs.

This paper examines the relation between geographic diversification and credit risk in microfinance. The empirical findings from the banking industry are mixed and inconclusive. This study extends the discussion into a new international setting: the global microfinance industry with lenders having both social and financial objectives. Using a large global sample of microfinance institutions (MFIs), we find that geographic diversification comes with more credit risks. However, this finding is more pronounced among non-shareholder MFIs like NGOs and cooperatives, compared to shareholder-owned MFIs. Moreover, the results show that MFIs can mitigate the effect of geographic diversification on risk with group lending methodology.

This paper investigates the relations between female leadership, firm performance, and corporate governance in a global panel of 329 Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) in 73 countries covering the years 1998–2008. The microfinance industry is particularly suited for studying the impact of female leadership on governance and performance because of its mission orientation, its entrepreneurial nature, diverse institutional conditions, and high percentage of female leaders. We find female leadership to be significantly associated with larger boards, younger firms, a non-commercial legal status, and more female clientele. Furthermore, we find that a female chief executive officer and a female chairman of the board are positively related to MFI performance, but this result is not driven by improved governance.