There is continuing controversy over the importance of credit constraints. This paper investigates whether total household expenditure and debt is affected by an exogenous increase in access to credit provided by a credit market reform that enabled Danish house owners to use housing equity as collateral for consumption loans. We find that the magnitude of the response is correlated with the amount of equity released by the reform and that the effect is strongest for younger households. Even for this group, the response was moderate. The aggregate effect of the reform was significant but small.

We exploit a mortgage reform that differentially unlocked home equity across the Danish population and study how this impacted selection into entrepreneurship. We find that increased entry was concentrated among entrepreneurs whose firms were founded in industries where they had no prior work experience. Nevertheless, we find that marginal entrants benefiting from the reform had higher pre-entry earnings and a significant share of these entrants started longer-lasting firms. Our results are most consistent with a view that housing collateral enabled higher ability individuals with less-well-established track records to overcome credit rationing and start new firms, rather than only leading to ‘frivolous entry’ by those without prior industry experience.

We introduce a survey instrument to measure earnings risk allowing for the possibility of quitting or being fired from the current job. We find these transitions to be the key drivers of subjective risk. A link with administrative data provides multiple credibility checks and reveals that subjective earnings risk varies systematically across the population. It is also many times smaller than traditional estimates even when conditioning richly on demographics and job history. We show that subjective earnings risk can help explain why many hold limited liquid assets.

Using Danish high-frequency payroll data and tax reform variation, we detect year-end tax avoidance among top managers. Five to seven percent of top managers exploit year-end tax planning strategies to save taxes. Around 30 percent of the top managers engaging in year-end tax avoidance do so by retiming bonus payments while the rest shift regular wage income. However, bonus timing is most tax-sensitive. When considering all of the top managers receiving a December bonus, we find that more than one-quarter retime the bonus payment, whereas only 5 percent of those not receiving a bonus shift regular wage income.

Using 41 million observations on savings for the population of Denmark, we show that the effects of retirement savings policies on wealth accumulation depend on whether they change savings rates by active or passive choice. Subsidies for retirement accounts, which rely on individuals to take an action to raise savings, primarily induce individuals to shift assets from taxable accounts to retirement accounts. We estimate that each $1 of government expenditure on subsidies increases total saving by only 1 cent. In contrast, policies that raise retirement contributions if individuals take no action—such as automatic employer contributions to retirement accounts—increase wealth accumulation substantially. We estimate that approximately 15% of individuals are “active savers” who respond to tax subsidies primarily by shifting assets across accounts; 85% of individuals are “passive savers” who are unresponsive to subsidies but are instead heavily influenced by automatic contributions made on their behalf. Active savers tend to be wealthier and more financially sophisticated. We conclude that automatic contributions are more effective at increasing savings rates than subsidies for three reasons: (i) subsidies induce relatively few individuals to respond, (ii) they generate substantial crowd-out conditional on response, and (iii) they do not increase the savings of passive individuals, who are least prepared for retirement.

This paper documents a large association between individuals’ time discounting in incentivized experiments and their positions in the real-life wealth distribution derived from Danish high-quality administrative data for a large sample of middle-aged individuals. The association is stable over time, exists through the wealth distribution and remains large after controlling for education, income profile, school grades, initial wealth, parental wealth, credit constraints, demographics, risk preferences, and additional behavioral parameters. Our results suggest that savings behavior is a driver of the observed association between patience and wealth inequality as predicted by standard savings theory.