This paper is a theoretical investigation of equilibrium forward and futures prices. We construct a rational expectations model in continuous time of a multigood, identical consumer economy with constant stochastic returns to scale production. Using this model we find three main results. First, we find formulas for equilibrium forward, futures, discount bond, commodity bond and commodity option prices. Second, we show that a futures price is actually a forward price for the delivery of a random number of units of a good; the random number is the return earned from continuous reinvestment in instantaneously riskless bonds until maturity of the futures contract. Third, we find and interpret conditions under which normal backwardation or contango is found in forward or futures prices; these conditions reflect the usefulness of forward and futures contracts as consumption hedges.

In a general equilibrium model of a labor economy, the size of government, measured by the share of income redistributed, is determined by majority rule. Voters rationally anticipate the disincentive effects of taxation on the labor-leisure choices of their fellow citizens and take the effect into account when voting. The share of earned income redistributed depends on the voting rule and on the distribution of productivity in the economy. Under majority rule, the equilibrium tax share balances the budget and pays for the voters' choices. The principal reasons for increased size of government implied by the model are extensions of the franchise that change the position of the decisive voter in the income distribution and changes in relative productivity. An increase in mean income relative to the income of the decisive voter increases the size of government.

[In a general equilibrium model of a labor economy, the size of government, measured by the share of income redistributed, is determined by majority rule. Voters rationally anticipate the disincentive effects of taxation on the labor-leisure choices of their fellow citizens and take the effect into account when voting. The share of earned income redistributed depends on the voting rule and on the distribution of productivity in the economy. Under majority rule, the equilibrium tax share balances the budget and pays for the voters' choices. The principal reasons for increased size of government implied by the model are extensions of the franchise that change the position of the decisive voter in the income distribution and changes in relative productivity. An increase in mean income relative to the income of the decisive voter increases the size of government.]

I wish to dedicate the paper to Mark Perlman, who guided this Journal until now. Perlman's help and encouragement in preparing this paper were characteristically vigorous and scholarly. I wish to express appreciation to the Hoover Institution where an early draft was written and to E. S. Shaw for his comments on that draft. Alex Cukierman, Brian Kantor, Scott Richard, and E. Roy Weintraub made several helpful suggestions, and Karl Brunner suffered through many discussions about Keynes and Keynesians. Many people read and commented on the previous draft, and their suggestions and criticisms have helped me to see points I would have missed. I am grateful especially to Paul Davidson and Donald Moggridge. Davidson commented generously and helpfully on almost every page. Moggridge helped me to strengthen my argument and graciously made available sections of volume 27 of Keynes's Collected Writings that had not been published at the time.