We examine the effects of organization capital—evident in management quality practices—on firms’ implied cost of equity. We show that superior management practices decrease firms’ cost of equity capital. This novel finding, robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses and to endogeneity bias, highlights the importance of superior management practices in improving firms’ financing conditions. In sum, this study demonstrates that the quality of management practices maps onto firms’ financing conditions, stressing the value relevance of intangible assets.

Using unique data on TSX Attributed Trading and a new proxy of Tobin's Q that accounts for intangible capital (Peters and Taylor, 2017), we investigate the impact of anonymous trading (AT) on managers' ability to use feedback conveyed by stock prices to improve investment efficiency. We show that AT reduces investment efficiency and that both anonymous buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades have comparable effects. The negative effect of AT on managerial learning from stock prices is significant only for tangible investments and when disagreement among anonymous traders is high. Taken together, our new evidence indicates that AT distorts investment sensitivity to Tobin's Q, plausibly because anonymity attracts additional (uninformed) liquidity trading, which negatively impacts the effectiveness of asset prices in aggregating private information and in revealing fundamentals.

In this paper we investigate the relation between trade credit provision and national culture as captured by Hofstede's four cultural dimensions (collectivism/individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity/femininity). Consistent with our predictions based on several theories of trade credit, we find that after controlling for firm- and country-level factors as well as industry effects, trade credit provision is higher in countries with higher collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity scores. These results are robust to using alternative measures of culture and trade credit, alternative sample compositions, and alternative estimation methods, as well as to addressing potential endogeneity concerns. International trade openness, however, mitigates the relation between trade credit provision and our proxies for national culture.

Using a sample of 2,516 U.S. mutual funds over the 2010–2017 period, we examine the effects of socially responsible investing (SRI) on mutual fund performance. We use two proxies for deviations from SRI: social active share (SAS), and social tracking error (STE). Respectively, they capture the differences in holdings and returns between a fund and a socially responsible index, the MSCI KLD 400. In univariate analyses, the SAS results align with more socially responsible funds outperforming less socially responsible funds, while the STE results provide mixed evidence. In multivariate analyses, both SAS and STE show that more socially responsible funds outperform their less socially responsible peers. We also find that socially responsible funds exhibit lower risk. Taken together, our results provide evidence that SRI does not damage fund performance but can reduce fund risk.

We use an asset-weighted composite corporate social responsibility (CSR) fund score to study the effects of CSR on fund performance and flows. Compared to low-CSR funds, high-CSR funds display poorer performance, stronger performance persistence, a weaker performance-flow relationship, and comparable persistence in flows. These findings are consistent with investors in high-CSR funds deriving utility from non-performance attributes.

We examine the influence of political rights on the implied cost of equity capital using a sample of firms from 44 countries. We find that firms' equity financing costs are lower when political rights are stronger. We further find that political institutions' direct impact on the cost of equity capital is incremental to that of legal institutions. Economically, our results imply that a one standard deviation increase in political rights is associated with a 38 basis point decrease in corporate cost of equity capital. In additional analyses, we find that the effect of political rights on equity pricing is more pronounced in countries with weak legal institutions.

We examine the effect of economic policy uncertainty on the relation between investment and the cost of capital. Using the news-based index developed by Baker et al. (2016) for twenty-one countries, we find that the strength of the negative relation between investment and the cost of capital decreases during times of high economic policy uncertainty. An increase in policy uncertainty reduces the sensitivity of investment to the cost of capital most for firms operating in industries that depend strongly on government subsidies and government consumption as well as in countries with high state ownership. Consistent with the price informativeness channel, we find that an increase in policy uncertainty reduces the investment-cost of capital sensitivity for firms from more opaque countries, firms with low analyst coverage, firms with no credit rating, and small firms. We conclude that economic policy uncertainty distorts the fundamental relation between investment and the cost of capital.

We investigate how stakeholder-centric corporate misconduct (CM) influences firms’ financial policies. CM is associated with higher cash holdings and lower dividend payouts and debt financing. These effects are more pronounced in firms with stronger governance. We further show that high cash holdings in CM firms are associated with higher firm value and lower implied cost of capital. Firms that replace their CEOs following CM adopt more conservative financial policies. Our evidence supports the precautionary motive for cash holdings, indicating that such reserves are unlikely to result from agency conflicts or increased managerial discretion in CM firms.