In this paper, we examine convergence of stock markets. Our empirical exercise is based on 11 different panels, which together consist of 120 countries. The richness of the dataset allows us to disaggregate countries into panels, such as high income, middle income, low income, OECD, CSI, and developing country panels. In addition, we construct regional panels, such as those representing the Arab States, East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Our main finding is that, based on the conditional convergence model, convergence of stock market capitalization and stocks traded is found for four panels, namely the high and low-income panels, the OECD panel, and the Sub-Saharan African panel. The speed of convergence is high, in most cases between 20% and 30%.

This study examines the impact of the California Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004 on CEO compensation costs in affected organizations. Contrary to the stated objective of the Act that executive compensation is “just and reasonable,” we find that CEO compensation costs for affected nonprofits during the post-regulation periods have increased by about 6.3 percent when compared with a control group of comparable unaffected nonprofits. In addition, the relative increase in CEO compensation appears to come from nonprofits that have experienced greater regulatory cost increases. We do not find evidence that the Act resulted in a change in CEO pay performance sensitivity. The observed CEO pay increase is not systematically different across nonprofits that underpaid versus those that overpaid their CEOs during pre-Act periods. Overall, this paper highlights the unintended consequences of regulatory attempts to enhance governance in the not-for-profit sector.