An important challenge for management control (MC) research is to better understand how MC practices work together in combinations. We approach this challenge from the perspective of survey researchers and, first, reflect on the potential of survey research to inform the debate on systems of control. Second, we draw on the article by Grabner and Moers (2013) to discuss how contemporary survey research can be strengthened by following their suggestions.

The purpose of this paper is to shed insights into the current inconsistencies of the control-innovation relationship. We draw on the dynamic capabilities literature to hypothesize that diagnostic and interactive control uses are indirectly related to innovativeness through their influence on the perceived formalization of coordination routines. That is, diagnostic and interactive control uses provide an input for an effective coordination process; the information provided allows for the coordination of activities to flourish. Further, we draw on contingency literature to hypothesize that the controls' direct effect on innovativeness depends on the degree of technological turbulence. Using data from a survey of 695 RD it includes a previously un-researched mediating variable (coordination routines), a moderator (technological turbulence), and two types of innovativeness (rate and newness). Second, the study demonstrates why and when diagnostic use is beneficial for innovativeness.

Using archival data from the U.S. passenger airline industry, this study examines whether management control mechanisms aimed at mitigating moral hazard explain outsourcing decisions over and above transaction cost economics (TCE) determinants documented in prior research. Consistent with TCE theory, we find that in‐house production efficiencies and our proxy for transaction risk (i.e., deriving from transaction infrequency, transaction complexity, and relationship‐specific investments) significantly explain the extent of outsourcing of aircraft maintenance. We extend TCE insights to show that incentive delta (i.e., the sensitivity of CEO portfolio holdings to stock price changes) strengthens the negative association between production efficiencies and outsourcing while incentive vega (i.e., the sensitivity of CEO holdings to stock return volatility) weakens the negative association between transaction risk and outsourcing. Monitoring strengthens the negative association between in‐house production efficiencies and outsourcing, but has no effect on the transaction risk–outsourcing relation. The results suggest that the use of outsourcing to achieve cost savings is promoted through both incentive contracts and monitoring, but outsourcing to achieve the desired risk level is promoted only through incentive contracts.

Recent studies have provided theory and evidence that the contemporaneous relation between stock returns and accounting earnings is nonlinear, different for profits and losses, and different across firms. Since each factor can result from differences in earnings persistence, existing theory is ambiguous as to whether these factors are distinct or overlapping. Thus, we conduct a simultaneous examination. Our primary tests show that each factor explains a significant portion of the variance of returns after controlling for the other two factors, with firm-specific estimation providing the largest incremental explanatory power. Alternative tests produce similar conclusions. Empirically, the three factors are distinct.