Using bottom-up information from corporate financial statements, we examine the relation between aggregate investment, future equity returns, and investor sentiment. Consistent with the business cycle literature, corporate investments peak during periods of positive sentiment, yet these periods are followed by lower equity returns. This pattern exists in most developed countries and survives controls for discount rates, equity flows, valuation multiples, operating accruals, and other investor sentiment measures. Higher aggregate investments also precede greater earnings disappointments, lower short-window earnings announcement returns, and lower macroeconomic growth. We conclude aggregate corporate investment is an alternative, and possibly sharper, measure of market-wide investor sentiment.

Economists have long observed that stock price bubbles are associated with corporate overinvestment. We study the ex-ante identification of bubbles (i.e. stock price booms followed by busts) by examining industry-level investments in net operating asset (NOA) accruals and stock returns for 49 countries around the world. Consistent with overinvestment in operating assets being key to bubble formation, we document five findings: (1) NOA accruals positively forecast the eventual crash of an industry price run-up; (2) NOA accruals negatively forecast stock returns following a run-up; (3) NOA accruals are positively associated with investor sentiment; (4) higher NOA accruals forecast more disappointing earnings relative to analysts’ expectations for run-up industries; and (5) NOA accruals are sharply stronger predictors of crashes, returns and analyst forecast errors following run-ups compared to other periods. Our results provide the first evidence that accounting information identifies stock price bubbles and suggest that financial statements are important for detecting and anticipating industry- and market-level inefficiencies.

This paper examines how low financial reporting frequency affects investors' reliance on alternative sources of earnings information. We find that the returns of semi-annual earnings announcers (i.e., low reporting frequency stocks [LRF]) are almost twice as sensitive to the earnings announcement returns of U.S. industry bellwether peers for non-reporting periods compared to reporting periods. Strikingly, these heightened spillovers are followed by return reversals when investors finally observe own-firm earnings at the subsequent semi-annual earnings announcement. This indicates that investors periodically overreact to peer-firm earnings news in the absence of own-firm earnings disclosures in interim periods. We also find elevated price volatility and trading volume around earnings announcements for non-reporting periods, consistent with theories of investor overconfidence. Collectively, our results suggest that investors are unable to successfully offset the information loss arising from low reporting frequency, thus impairing their ability to value firms and adversely affecting the quality of financial markets. JEL Classifications: M41; M48; G14. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

We identify sustainability‐focused analysts using recent advances in machine learning combined with conference call transcripts. Sustainability‐focused analysts issue more accurate earnings forecasts, and the stock market reacts more strongly to their revisions. The forecasting advantage of sustainability‐focused analysts is amplified for material sustainability issues, small firms, and growth firms. Consistent with a learning curve in understanding how sustainability issues relate to future performance, we find that less experienced analysts are less likely to focus on sustainability and that they reap fewer benefits in forecast accuracy when they do so. Our results suggest that far from being an inefficient use of time and resources, focusing on sustainability provides a competitive advantage in one of the most pivotal steps in valuation: forecasting earnings.

Accruals are fundamental to financial reporting and are the underlying innovation of accounting. Despite this, accounting research has provided little understanding of how economic forces affect a firm׳s level of accruals and limited guidance for forming expectations of accruals based on ex ante firm characteristics. We consider accruals as a form of investment and examine whether theoretical predictions from a real options-based investment framework provide insight into the relation between accruals and the ex ante expected volatility faced by the firm. Specifically, the theory predicts that higher volatility dampens investment because firms prefer to ‘wait and see’ instead of investing immediately. Consistent with this theory, we document a robust negative relation between year-ahead net working capital accruals and expected volatility. We also predict and find that the negative association between year-ahead net working capital accruals and expected volatility is less pronounced for distressed firms and more pronounced for firms with a longer operating cycle, and that current asset accruals are more sensitive to volatility than current liability accruals. Finally, we find that the residuals from an investment-based expected accrual model outperform those from the widely-used performance-adjusted modified Jones model in identifying companies that just meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts. Collectively, our findings suggest that the investment perspective of accruals, and in particular the real options-based investment framework, provide useful insights for forming expectations of accruals.

While the shareholder benefits of audits are well documented, evidence on whether audits can facilitate opportunistic behavior by corporate insiders is scarce. In this paper, we examine whether the audit process facilitates one particular form of opportunism: informed trading by corporate insiders. We focus our analysis on insider trading around the audit report date. We find an increase in trading around the audit report date and that the increase is abnormally large for firms that subsequently report modified opinions. The abnormal increase in trading is concentrated among officers and non-audit committee independent directors, and most pronounced in first-time modified opinions and modified opinions in years where financial results are subsequently restated. These trades are highly opportunistic: they predict restatements, and as a consequence, we show they avoid significant losses. Collectively, our findings provide novel evidence that insiders appear to exploit private information about the audit process––a process ostensibly designed to protect shareholders––for opportunistic gain.

We document a growing disparity in earnings disclosure mechanisms. Firms are increasingly disclosing earnings announcements (EA) concurrently with the 10-K filing instead of first issuing a ‘stand-alone’ EA. Firm adoption of concurrent EA/10-Ks is associated with lower investor sophistication, greater impediments to producing timely and reliable earnings information, and greater industry-level concurrent reporting. Concurrent EA/10-Ks differ from stand-alone EAs in that investors anticipate more information in the EA, disclosures are preempted by industry peer EAs, the market reaction is muted even when controlling for EA timing, and post-earnings-announcement drift is greater.

We provide the first evidence that prudential principles shape bankers' executive compensation, a phenomenon we call “pay for prudence” (PfP). We conjecture that PfP incentivizes bankers to balance shareholders' preference for risk with regulators' preference for prudence. Although PfP terms are often used in bank compensation contracts, we find that the use of detailed and concrete PfP terms are positively associated with equity incentives for risk-taking. Furthermore, detailed and concrete PfP terms are associated with lower tail risk, fewer bad loans, and lower likelihood of regulatory downgrades. While we do not find evidence that PfP is associated with lower profitability, PfP is associated with more diversified loan portfolios and reduced exposure to real estate. Our results shed light on a new dimension of bankers' pay and suggest that PfP-based incentives complement widely studied equity-based incentives for risk-taking by acting as guard rails that guide managers’ pursuit of investment opportunities.