This study investigates the relationship between corporate political activities (CPA) and a firm's carbon emissions level. We test two competing hypotheses suggesting that political connections either incentivize firms toward stricter environmental standards through reputational pressures or enable higher emissions via regulatory leniency and compromised governance. Utilizing a large sample of U.S. firms, we find robust evidence that politically connected firms have significantly higher carbon emissions. Specifically, adding one politically connected independent director increases absolute emissions by approximately 20% and emission intensity by 16%. These results remain consistent after extensive robustness checks and addressing endogeneity through a stacked difference-in-differences design around director turnover events. We further identify regulatory leniency and weakened environmental governance as mechanisms driving these higher emissions. Cross-sectional analyses reveal that the CPA-emissions relationship is stronger in politically conservative states, financially constrained firms, competitive industries, and complex organizations, whereas institutional investors help mitigate this effect. Our findings highlight how corporate political strategies exacerbate environmental externalities, contributing to the understanding of the broader ecological and societal consequences of firms' nonmarket behaviors.

We examine whether and how national culture influences corporate innovation using a newly available comprehensive database on innovation around the world. After controlling for the impacts of formal institutions, and firm-level and country-level variables, we find that culture has relevance for innovation: The probability of a firm innovating is higher in individualistic, indulgent, and long-term oriented societies, as well as in cultures with less power distance, less uncertainty avoidance, and less masculine cultures. In the innovative firms subsample, we continue to find the same significant impact of culture on firms' innovation performance/quality. Our results are robust to endogeneity concerns, different model specifications, alternative measures of innovation and culture, and different subsample analyses.

We examine the impact of liberal judge ideology, as an exogenous proxy for litigation risk, on firms' choice of debt structure. In line with the substitution of governance mechanisms hypothesis, we find that U.S. firms headquartered in circuits dominated by liberal judges rely less on bank debt financing. We also show that the substitution away from bank borrowing arising from liberal judge ideology leads to a greater reliance on other financing alternatives, such as public debt and equity financing. Additional analyses indicate that the effect of liberal judge ideology is amplified for firms operating in competitive markets, firms facing tighter financial constraints, and firms with more growth opportunities. The governance substitution effect is, however, less pronounced for firms with higher institutional ownership. Overall, our findings suggest that, by exacerbating litigation risk, liberal judge ideology induces firms to trade-off creditor governance stemming from bank debt with governance by litigation, thus decreasing their reliance on bank debt in favor of alternative financing sources with less strict constraints and lower monitoring of managerial behavior.

Using a large panel of U.S. public firms, we examine the relation between annual report readability and cost of equity capital. We hypothesize that complex textual reporting deters investors' ability to process and interpret annual reports, leading to higher information risk, and thus higher cost of equity financing. Consistent with our prediction, we find that greater textual complexity is associated with higher cost of equity capital. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity checks, including use of multiple estimation methods, alternative proxies of annual report readability and cost of equity capital measures, and potential endogeneity concerns. In addition, we hypothesize and test whether the nature of the relation between readability and cost of capital depends on the tone of 10-K filings. Our results show that the effect of annual report complexity on cost of equity is greater when disclosure tone is more negative or more ambiguous. We also find that the effect of annual report readability on cost of equity capital depends on the degree of stock market competition, level of institutional investors' ownership, and analyst coverage.

We examine the role of institutional investors' investment horizon on the information content associated with dividend announcement surprises in the “dividend-reappearance era”. We find that the presence of institutional investors negatively affects the announcement period cumulative abnormal return (CAR), which suggests that institutional investors reduce information content of dividend announcements. This result is primarily driven by the fact that institutional investors, especially the not-short-horizon investors, do not prefer dividend surprises – which leads to lower announcement period CAR. We do not find support for institutional investors' informed trading argument. Our study reveals that in order to understand the dynamics between institutional ownership and information content of dividend announcements, it is important to differentiate the institutional investors' investment horizons.

The scarcity of suitable proxies for asymmetric information has impeded empirical research from providing reliable evidence on whether information risk shapes equity pricing. In reexamining this unresolved question, we rely on firms’ geographic distance from financial centers to gauge information asymmetry. We provide strong, robust evidence supporting the prediction that equity financing is cheaper for firms nearer central locations, implying that investors rationally require more compensation when information asymmetry is worse. The equity pricing role of geographic proximity is economically large, with our coefficient estimates translating into firms located within 100 kilometers of the city center of the nearest of six major financial centers, or in their metropolitan statistical areas, enjoying equity financing costs that are seven basis points lower. Our inferences are insensitive to measuring both the cost of equity capital and distance in several ways, controlling for corporate governance quality, and addressing endogeneity. Collectively, our analysis suggests that investors discount the price that they pay for their securities to reflect the greater information asymmetry that ensues when firms are far from major financial centers.

We examine whether media coverage affects credit rating change decisions by analyzing 732,426 newspaper items published by top U.S. media outlets on S&P 1500 firms. Our results show that negative media coverage has a strong association with credit rating change events, but positive media coverage does not. We find support for two channels that confirm this finding: the media's fundamental information content and the media's reputational pressure. Credit rating agencies appear to consider the fundamental information embedded in negative media coverage and recognize negative market sentiment when making rating change decisions.

Building on recent research linking changes in housing prices to investors’ degree of risk aversion, we posit that there is a negative relation between growth in housing prices and a firm’s cost of equity capital. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that firms located in states with positive growth rates in housing prices exhibit lower costs of equity capital. We also observe that the effect of changes in housing prices is mainly driven by smaller firms. This housing effect is not only statistically significant but also economically important. Our results hold across various measures of growth rates in housing prices and are robust to controlling for potential biases due to measurement errors in estimating the implied cost of equity capital. This study is the first to establish an association between growth rates in housing prices and firms’ cost of equity capital. It also contributes to the emerging literature on the economic importance of a firm’s geographic location.