[We show that state corruption and political connections have strong effects on municipal bond sales and underwriting. Higher state corruption is associated with greater credit risk and higher bond yields. Corrupt states can eliminate the corruption yield penalty by purchasing credit enhancements. Underwriting fees were significantly higher during an era when underwriters made political contributions to win underwriting business. This pay-toplay underwriting fee premium exists only for negotiated bid bonds where underwriting business can be allocated on the basis of political favoritism. Overall, our results show a strong impact of corruption and political connections on financial market outcomes.]

A growing literature finds that firm asset growth rates are negatively correlated with subsequent stock returns. We show that the poor post-deal returns that have been documented for stock acquisitions are more precisely explained by the return effects associated with systematically larger asset growth rates for stock deals. We find a similar result for other cross-sectional and time-series acquisition effects, including poor returns for glamour deals, weakly monitored deals, and deals done during high-valuation periods. We suggest that the distinguishing characteristic associated with poor performing acquisitions is simply their tendency to grow assets.

Using a broad sample of international corporate bond offerings, we provide evidence that corporate borrowers make opportunistic currency choices, in that they denominate the currency of their bonds in a manner that is inconsistent with a belief in either covered or uncovered interest rate parity. Using firm-level tests, we identify a number of characteristics of firms that engage in opportunistic behavior. We observe that large issuers located in developed markets with investment-grade ratings and low cash flow characterize those firms that are responsive to covered borrowing rate differences across currencies. Corporate responsiveness to uncovered borrowing rate differences appears more general. We observe that although the gains firms achieve through opportunistic currency denomination are economically significant, the yield differential tends to systematically decline after issuance. This finding suggests that opportunistic issuance by corporations may be a primary mechanism for driving covered interest yields toward parity.

We compare investment policies across public and private firms in different institutional settings. Using a large cross-country data set, we find that public listed firms are better positioned to take advantage of growth opportunities than private firms. Specifically, public listed firms exhibit higher investment sensitivity to growth opportunities than private firms. This differential, however, only exists in countries with well-developed stock markets. Furthermore, the relative advantage public firms have at allocating capital depends on the degree of agency costs and reliance on external equity.

We explore whether the relation between stock splits and clientele is driven by binding tick sizes. We find little evidence that firms adjusted prices to maintain similarly binding tick sizes as the NYSE reduced tick sizes. Furthermore, though splits that increase the extent to which tick sizes are binding are associated with greater increases in spreads, these splits experience similar changes in measures related to clientele, including trade size, breadth of individual and institutional ownership, and analyst following. We find little evidence supporting theories, such as spread-induced sponsorship, that rely on binding tick sizes to link splits and clientele.

We examine the impact of stock market liquidity on managerial payout decisions. We argue that stock market liquidity influences payout policy through a first-order effect on the share repurchase decision, and a second-order or residual effect on the dividend decision. Managers compare the tax and flexibility advantages of a repurchase against its liquidity cost disadvantage. All else equal, higher market liquidity encourages the use of repurchases over dividends. Our empirical results confirm that stock market liquidity plays a significant role in repurchase and dividend initiations, as well as in recurring payout decisions. Unlike previous studies that measure liquidity changes following the repurchase decision, we examine liquidity levels prior to the payout decision. We show that managers condition their repurchase decision on a sufficient level of market liquidity, consistent with Barclay and Smith's [Barclay, M.J., Smith, C.W. Jr., 1988. Corporate payout policy: cash dividends versus open-market repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics 22, 61–82.] theoretical analysis and Brav et al.'s [Brav, A., Graham, J.R., Campbell, R.H., Michaely, R., 2005. Payout policy in the 21st century. Journal of Financial Economics 77, 483–528.] CFO survey results. Repurchases have recently become the payout decision of choice in part because of rising stock market liquidity.

We show that state corruption and political connections have strong effects on municipal bond sales and underwriting. Higher state corruption is associated with greater credit risk and higher bond yields. Corrupt states can eliminate the corruption yield penalty by purchasing credit enhancements. Underwriting fees were significantly higher during an era when underwriters made political contributions to win underwriting business. This pay-to-play underwriting fee premium exists only for negotiated bid bonds where underwriting business can be allocated on the basis of political favoritism. Overall, our results show a strong impact of corruption and political connections on financial market outcomes.