The fee structure used to compensate investment advisers is central to the study of fund design, and affects investor welfare in at least three ways: (i) by influencing the portfolio-selection incentives of the adviser, (ii) by affecting risk-sharing between adviser and investor, and (iii) through its use as a signal of quality by superior investment advisers. In this paper, we describe a model in which all of these features are present, and use it to compare two popular and contrasting forms of fee contracts, the "fulcrum" and the "incentive" types, from the standpoint of investor welfare. While the former has some undeniably attractive features (that have, in particular, been used by regulators to justify its mandatory use in a mutual fund context), we find surprisingly that it is the latter that is often more attractive from the standpoint of investor welfare. Our model is a flexible one; our conclusions are shown to be robust to many extensions of interest. The results are also extended to consider unrestricted fee structures and competitive markets for fund managers.

An extensive empirical literature in finance has documented not only the presence of anamolies in the Black-Scholes model, but also the "term-structures" of these anamolies (for instance, the behavior of the volatility smile or of unconditional returns at different maturities). Theoretical efforts in the literature at addressing these anamolies have largely focussed on two extensions of the Black-Scholes model: introducing jumps into the return process, and allowing volatility to be stochastic. This paper employs commonly-used versions of these two classes of models to examine the extent to which the models are theoretically capable of resolving the observed anamolies. We find that each model exhibits some "term-structure" patterns that are fundamentally inconsistent with those observed in the data. As a consequence, neither class of models constitutes an adequate explanation of the empirical evidence, although stochastic volatility models fare better than jumps in this regard.

The fee structure used to compensate investment advisers is central to the study of fund design, and affects investor welfare in at least three ways: (i) by influencing the portfolio-selection incentives of the adviser, (ii) by affecting risk-sharing between adviser and investor, and (iii) through its use as a signal of quality by superior investment advisers. In this paper, we describe a model in which all of these features are present, and use it to compare two popular and contrasting forms of fee contracts, the “fulcrum” and the “incentive” types, from the standpoint of investor welfare. While the former has some undeniably attractive features (that have, in particular, been used by regulators to justify its mandatory use in a mutual fund context), we find surprisingly that it is the latter that is often more attractive from the standpoint of investor welfare. Our model is a flexible one; our conclusions are shown to be robust to many extensions of interest. The results are also extended to consider unrestricted fee structures and competitive markets for fund managers.

Returns on international equities are characterized by jumps; moreover, these jumps tend to occur at the same time across countries leading to systemic risk . We capture these stylized facts using a multivariate system of jump‐diffusion processes where the arrival of jumps is simultaneous across assets. We then determine an investor's optimal portfolio for this model of returns. Systemic risk has two effects: One, it reduces the gains from diversification and two, it penalizes investors for holding levered positions. We find that the loss resulting from diminished diversification is small, while that from holding very highly levered positions is large.

We assume that the instantaneous riskless rate reverts toward a central tendency which, in turn, is changing stochastically over time. As a result, current short-term rates are not sufficient to predict future short-term rate movements, as it would be the case if the central tendency were constant. However, since longer maturity bond prices incorporate information about the central tendency, longer maturity bond yields can be used to predict future short-term rate movements. We develop a two-factor model of the term structure which implies that a linear combination of any two rates can be used as a proxy for the central tendency. Based on this central-tendency proxy, we estimate a model of the one-month rate that performs better than models which assume the central tendency to be constant.