We study the debt-stabilizing properties of indexing debt to GDP using a consumption-based macro-finance model. To this end, we derive quasi-analytical pricing formulas for any type of bond/equity by exploiting the discretization of the state-space, making large-scale simulations tractable. We find that GDP-linked security prices would embed time-varying risk premiums of about 40 basis points. For a fixed budget surplus, issuing GDP-linked securities does not imply more beneficial debt-to-GDP ratios in the long-run, while the debt-stabilizing budget surplus is more predictable at the expense of being higher. Our findings call into question the view that such securities tame debt.

We define a disastrous default as the default of a systemic entity. Such an event is expected to have a negative effect on the economy and to be contagious. Bringing macroeconomic structure to a no-arbitrage asset-pricing framework, we exploit prices of disaster-exposed assets (credit and equity derivatives) to extract information on (i) the expected influence of a disastrous default on consumption and (ii) the probability of a financial meltdown. Using European data, we find that the returns of disaster-exposed assets are consistent with a systemic default being followed by a 2% decrease in consumption. The recessionary influence of disastrous defaults implies that financial instruments whose payoffs are exposed to such credit events carry substantial risk premiums. We also produce systemic risk indicators based on the probability of observing a certain number of systemic defaults or a sharp drop of consumption.