Using a new dataset of UK-syndicated loans, we document a significant loan cost disadvantage incurred by privately held firms. For identification, we use the distance of a firm's headquarters to London's capital markets as a plausibly exogenous variation in corporate structure (i.e., public/private) choice. We analyze the channels of the loan cost disadvantage of being private by documenting the importance of: the higher costs of information production, the lower bargaining power, the differences in ownership structure, and the differences in secondary market trading. Interestingly, we find no evidence that lenders price expected future performance into the loan spread differential.

[Using a new dataset of UK-syndicated loans, we document a significant loan cost disadvantage incurred by privately held firms. For identification, we use the distance of a firm's headquarters to London's capital markets as a plausibly exogenous variation in corporate structure (i.e., public/private) choice. We analyze the channels of the loan cost disadvantage of being private by documenting the importance of: the higher costs of information production, the lower bargaining power, the differences in ownership structure, and the differences in secondary market trading. Interestingly, we find no evidence that lenders price expected future performance into the loan spread differential.]

We assess the relative importance of ratings versus stock exchange listings in reducing information asymmetry using a dataset of syndicated loans to public and private firms in the UK. We find that the certification effect of ratings is largest for private firms and that syndicates are smallest if firms are privately held or unrated. Moreover, we find that the marginal effect of being stock exchange listed is insignificant once these firms are rated. Exploiting the heterogeneity among lenders, we find that especially foreign bank and non-bank investors do not provide capital if firms are unrated. Our paper highlights the information produced by rating agencies as an important mechanism by which ratings improve access to capital. Our results also emphasize the importance of syndicate moral hazard on the supply of uninformed capital: bank–borrower relationships significantly increase the loan share syndicated to investors particularly if firms are not listed and unrated.

Using a unique dataset of more than 1 million loans made by 296 German banks, we evaluate the impact of many aspects of customer–bank relationships on loan default rates. Our research suggests a practical solution to reducing loan defaults for new customers: Have the customer open a simple transactions account – savings or checking account. Observe for some time and then decide whether to make a loan. Loans made under this model have lower default, as banks can use historical data about their borrowers to establish a baseline against which new client-related information can be evaluated. Banks assemble this historical information through relationships of different forms. We define relationships in many different ways to capture non-credit relationships, transaction accounts, as well as the depth and intensity of relationships, and find each of these can provide information that helps reduce default – even establishing a simple savings or checking account and observing the activity prior to loan granting can help reduce loan defaults. Our results show that banks with relationship-specific information act differently compared with banks that do not have this information both in screening and subsequent monitoring borrowers which helps reduce loan defaults.

Data on firm-loan-level daily credit line drawdowns in the United States expose a corporate “dash for cash” induced by the COVID-19 pandemic. In the first phase of the crisis, which was characterized by extreme precaution and heightened aggregate risk, all firms drew down bank credit lines and raised cash levels. In the second phase, which followed the adoption of stabilization policies, only the highest-rated firms switched to capital markets to raise cash. Consistent with the risk of becoming a fallen angel, the lowest-quality BBB-rated firms behaved more similarly to non-investment grade firms. The observed corporate behavior reveals the significant impact of credit risk on corporate cash holdings. (JEL G01, G14, G32, G35) Received July 13, 2020; editorial decision July 17, 2020 by Editor Andrew Ellul

This paper examines the broader effects of the US financial crisis on global lending to retail customers. In particular we examine retail bank lending in Germany using a unique data set of German savings banks during the period 2006 through 2008 for which we have the universe of loan applications and loans granted. Our experimental setting allows us to distinguish between savings banks affected by the US financial crisis through their holdings in Landesbanken with substantial subprime exposure and unaffected savings banks. The data enable us to distinguish between demand and supply side effects of bank lending and find that the US financial crisis induced a contraction in the supply of retail lending in Germany. While demand for loans goes down, it is not substantially different for the affected and nonaffected banks. More important, we find evidence of a significant supply side effect in that the affected banks reject substantially more loan applications than nonaffected banks. This result is particularly strong for smaller and more liquidity-constrained banks as well as for mortgage as compared with consumer loans. We also find that bank-depositor relationships help mitigate these supply side effects.

Syndication increases the overlap of bank loan portfolios and makes them more vulnerable to contagious effects. We develop a novel measure of bank interconnectedness using syndicated corporate loan portfolios, overlap based on industry and region, and different weights such as equal weights, size and relationships. We find that interconnectedness is driven mainly by bank diversification, less by bank size or overall loan market size. Interconnectedness is positively correlated with different bank-level systemic risk measures including SRISK, DIP and CoVaR, and such a positive correlation mainly arises from an elevated effect of interconnectedness on systemic risk during recessions. Overall, our results highlight that institution-level risk reduction through diversification ignores the negative externalities of an interconnected financial system.

European banks are exposed to a substantial amount of risky sovereign debt. “Missing capital” in the banking system resulting from the zero-risk weight exemption for European sovereign debt amplifies the co-movement between sovereign CDS spreads and facilitates cross-border crisis spillovers. Risks spill over from risky peripheral sovereigns to safer core countries, but not in the opposite direction nor for exposures to countries not exempted from risk-weighting. Unfunded non-domestic sovereign bond exposures primarily affect CDS spreads of non-GIIPS banks, while domestic sovereign-to-bank linkages are particularly important for GIIPS banks. Spillovers are attenuated when banks fund their sovereign bond exposures with capital.

We show that eurozone bank risks during 2007–2013 can be understood as carry trade behavior. Bank equity returns load positively on peripheral (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, or GIIPS) bond returns and negatively on German government bond returns, which generated carry until the deteriorating GIIPS bond returns adversely affected bank balance sheets. We find support for risk-shifting and regulatory arbitrage motives at banks in that carry trade behavior is stronger for large banks and banks with low capital ratios and high risk-weighted assets. We also find evidence for home bias and moral suasion in the subsample of GIIPS banks.

This paper examines the dynamic allocation of control rights in private debt contracts of firms. We show that a covenant violation in the prior loan contract implies a stigma for borrowers which results in stricter loan contract terms in subsequent new loan contracts. Our analyses reject potentially other explanations such as firm characteristics or agency problems between the lender and firm management, shareholders or public debtholders. After covenant violations in the prior contract, new loans have on average 18bps higher spreads and include more of those covenant types which also have been violated in the prior contract, with tighter thresholds.