[This article examines debt securities underwritten by Section 20 subsidiaries of bank holding companies relative to those underwritten by investment houses. Consistent with a net certification effect for banks, bank underwriting of lower credit rated firms to whom the bank lends results in relatively higher prices (lower yields). We find no evidence of conflicts of interest even when an issue is used to repay bank debt. Further, banks bring a relatively larger proportion of small issues to the market. Contrary to the contention that universal banking stunts availability of finance to small firms, bank underwritings appear to benefit small firms.]

This paper uses real estate investment data for major groups of U.S. financial institutions—commercial banks, thrifts, and life insurance companies—to evaluate their investment timing performance over the 1970–1989 period. Our major finding is that real estate investments by commercial banks and thrifts have largely been driven by past real estate and market returns rather than by future expected returns. This apparent “trend-chasing” investment strategy—of buying high and selling low—offers an explanation for the poor performance of their real estate investments. We argue that imposing market value accounting on such institutions may actually reinforce their “trend-chasing” behavior.

This paper traces developments in the credit risk measurement literature over the last 20 years. The paper is essentially divided into two parts. In the first part the evolution of the literature on the credit-risk measurement of individual loans and portfolios of loans is traced by way of reference to articles appearing in relevant issues of the Journal of Banking and Finance and other publications. In the second part, a new approach built around a mortality risk framework to measuring the risk and returns on loans and bonds is presented. This model is shown to offer some promise in analyzing the risk-return structures of portfolios of credit-risk exposed debt instruments.

This article examines debt securities underwritten by Section 20 subsidiaries of bank holding companies relative to those underwritten by investment houses. Consistent with a net certification effect for banks, bank underwriting of lower credit rated firms to whom the bank lends results in relatively higher prices (lower yields). We find no evidence of conflicts of interest even when an issue is used to repay bank debt. Further, banks bring a relatively larger proportion of small issues to the market. Contrary to the contention that universal banking stunts availability of finance to small firms, bank underwritings appear to benefit small firms.