One of the most dramatic trends in banking since the 1980s has been the secular movement away from core banking and interest generating activities towards enhanced reliance on non-interest-generating activities that focus largely on fees and trading profits. In this paper, we draw on a dataset covering nearly a million quarterly observations on more than 12,000 US banks and find no evidence that this shift in the bank business model harms bank profitability. To the contrary, a higher share of non-traditional bank income is associated with a higher profitability. The increase in profitability does not seem to come at the cost of substantially larger bank-level risk taking, at least not for large banks, which are the banks mostly involved in non-traditional bank business. There is also no conclusive evidence that a larger share of non-traditional income is associated with a larger contribution to systemic risk. The net benefits of non-traditional income increased in the 2000s, when both interest rates and bank margins started to decline. Estimation techniques that mitigate endogeneity concerns resulting from unobserved heterogeneity also show larger net benefits associated with greater bank reliance on generating non-traditional income.

Monetary policy influences a wide range of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) outcomes. First, an increase in the federal funds rate predicts a negative market reaction to M&A announcements, an increase in the likelihood of deal withdrawal, and significant financing challenges for the acquirer in the post-acquisition phase. Second, M&As announced during periods of high monetary policy uncertainty are associated with significant declines in acquirer value. This negative market reaction reflects a unique discount to compensate for the high riskiness of M&As in an uncertain monetary environment. Finally, we show that monetary contraction, rather than monetary policy uncertainty, is a key contributor to the decline in the aggregare M&A activity.

We investigate the extent to which the scheduled release of macroeconomic indicators affects the acquirer's value in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As). We find that M&As announced on days of the release of key macroeconomic indicators (i.e. indicator days) realize higher announcement period risk-adjusted returns compared to counterparts announced on non-indicator days. The positive wealth effect is due to the higher market attention on indicator days, which is particularly relevant for smaller M&As that are not usually exposed to significant investor scrutiny. The results hold after addressing self-selection bias concerns. We also find that firms announcing M&As on indicator days are more likely to “listen” to the market's feedback.

We examine the impact on a firm when it is forced to switch its bank relationship from one branch to another branch of the same bank, and how the firm’s information opacity (as proxied by the frequency with which the firm provides financial statements to the bank) moderates the consequences of relationship loss. We find the effect depends on the relative balance between the hard accounting information provided to the bank and the soft information about the firm due to its prior branch relationship. We show the loss of soft information provided to loan officers at the new branch, as a result of the forced branch switch, has a significant effect on the cost, maturity, and availability of loans from the new branch. Furthermore, we document the moderating effect of accounting information opacity on loan conditions upon relationship loss.