A unique but mostly unexplored feature of banks in debt markets is that they can either self-issue or use third-party underwriters. We analyze the importance of information sharing concerns, the need for certification and the value of underwriter distribution networks in two debt underwriting frameworks: the bank choice of self-underwriting versus third-party underwriting, and whether the bond is underwritten by a reputable bank. Exploring some specific structural features of European bank bond deals, we find that information sharing concerns are significantly related to the probability of self-issuance. The results also show that the need for certification, previous underwriting experience, issuer relationships with reputable underwriters and underwriter distribution capacity are particularly relevant for bank bonds underwritten by reputable banks.

We find that chief executive officers and chief financial officers exert significant individual effects on bank risk. Manager transitions, including transitions generated by plausibly exogenous manager departures, lead to abnormally large changes in bank risk. We demonstrate that the effects of managers on bank risk are sizable and manager-specific. The effects are also partly anticipated by the board because they are reflected in managers’ pay. However, wide-ranging personal attributes, including biographical, experience, and compensation data, only explain a small share of managers’ impact on bank risk. This implies that attempts to rein in bank risk-taking by targeting manager characteristics will be challenging for investors and regulators.

We present a pricing model of bank bailout insurance guarantees against tail risk and empirical evidence that provides a rational explanation why big bank equities “underperform” relative to small banks during normal times while they “overperform” during crises. A new measure accounting for left-tail risk protection against losses conditional on a crisis explains the “underperformance” of large banks during normal periods. Over the long-term spanning several economic cycles, bank assets are fairly priced regardless of size. Our empirical evidence supports our model’s predicted pattern of excess bank return reversals across economic cycles following Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) bailout policy in 1984.

We document a 24% decline in loan issuances in the UK syndicated loan market after the Brexit vote relative to a set of comparable loan markets. The decline in lending is driven by a pervasive reduction in demand by UK firms. Changes in GDP forecast around the Brexit vote explain about 61% of the decline in lending. We do not find evidence, however, that the United Kingdom loses its attractiveness as a financial center for cross-border lending. Our results point to the resilience of global financial centers in the face of large unexpected shocks.

Considerable debate surrounds how the US government's TARP bailout intervention has affected the risk-taking and moral hazard behavior of U.S. banks around the global financial crisis. We examine this issue with a focus on lottery behavior introducing MAX/MIN as a new measure of lotteryness in banking to capture the loss protection from bank bailout guarantees. We find that the TARP bailout increased the likelihood of bank lotteryness and risk shifting. Lottery-like bank equities are riskier after TARP and exhibit fatter right to left tails. A consistent pattern of risk taking and lottery behavior extends both before and after the 2008–2009 crisis, engulfing the largest systemic banks (SIFIs). While confirming that lottery-like bank equities have lower short-term return, we find they exhibit better cumulative long-term return performance. Our findings have important policy implications regarding government intervention in banking crises.