Millions of investors place their trust in financial advisors who may have incentives to give them bad advice. This may indicate that advisors behave more fairly than economic theory predicts. In this paper, we present results from a large-scale experiment studying advice-giving under conflicting interests. We use a binary dictator game as a baseline and transform it into a situation where the dictator gives advice that may or may not be followed. Our results show that people are averse to giving bad advice. When subjects are given the role of advisor, they behave less selfishly, even when the economic incentives and considerations remain the same as in the baseline dictator game.

Abstract The principle that people should be held personally responsible for the consequences of their choices is a fundamental moral ideal in Western societies. We report from a large-scale experimental study of how far-reaching this principle is for inequality acceptance. We show that third-party spectators violate minimal conditions for a morally relevant choice when making redistributive decisions for two workers. They accept more inequality when the workers have made nominal and forced choices than when brute luck is the source of inequality. We argue that our findings shed light on important current political debates about personal responsibility and redistributive policies.