The current financial crisis is the 19th such crisis in the post-war period in advanced economies. Recent literature classifies the Nordic crises in Norway, Sweden and Finland in late 1980s and early 1990s among the Big Five crises that have happened before the current crisis, which is now of a global nature. This paper outlines the developments of the Nordic crises, reasons behind them and crisis management by the authorities. Relatively more emphasis is placed on the Finnish crisis, as it was the deepest one. The paper concludes by considering the lessons that can be drawn from the Nordic crises.

We construct a rational expectations model in which the economy switches stochastically between periods of low and high growth. When agents expect growth to be slow, the returns on investment are low and little investment takes place. But if agents expect fast growth, investment is high, returns are high, and growth is rapid. This expectational indeterminacy is induced by monopolistic competition and complementarity between different types of capital goods. Neither externalities nor increasing returns to scale are required. The equilibrium with growth cycles is stable under the dynamics implied by a simple learning rule.

Linear rational expectations models with expectations of future endogenous variables have multiple equilibria. For a scalar model with k forward expectational lags and l backward lags, this paper characterizes the complete set of ARMA solutions. It is shown that the maximum degree solutions are ARMA (k + l, k), that the solutions of maximum degree are obtained directly from the characteristic polynomial but have arbitrary MA parameters, and that all lower degree ARMA solutions are obtained by deleting common factors in the AR and MA lag polynomials. The results are applied to several macroeconomic examples.

A fundamentals based monetary policy rule, which would be the optimal monetary policy without commitment when private agents have perfectly rational expectations, is unstable if in fact these agents follow standard adaptive learning rules. This problem can be overcome if private expectations are observed and suitably incorporated into the policy maker's optimal rule. These strong results extend to the case in which there is simultaneous learning by the policy maker and the private agents. Our findings show the importance of conditioning policy appropriately, not just on fundamentals, but also directly on observed household and firm expectations.

Drawing upon recent contributions in the statistical literature, we present new results on the convergence of recursive, stochastic algorithms which can be applied to economic models with learning and which generalize previous results. The formal results provide probability bounds for convergence which can be used to describe the local stability under learning of rational expectations equilibria in stochastic models. Economic examples include local stability in a multivariate linear model with multiple equilibria and global convergence in a model with a unique equilibrium.

We study how the use of judgment or “add-factors” in macroeconomic forecasting may disturb the set of equilibrium outcomes when agents learn using recursive methods. We examine the possibility of a new phenomenon, which we call exuberance equilibria, in the New Keynesian monetary policy framework. Inclusion of judgment in forecasts can lead to self-fulfilling fluctuations in a subset of the determinacy region. We study how policymakers can minimize the risk of exuberance equilibria.