We examine the value and incentive effects of six nontraditional executive stock options: premium options, performance-vested options, repriceable options, purchased options, reload options, and indexed options. With reasonable parameter values, four options have lower value than a traditional option when granted, and large differences in value are evident across the types. Holding option value constant, five options create stronger incentives than traditional options to increase stock price, five create stronger incentives to increase risk, and three create stronger incentives to reduce dividend yield. Changing various option-specific parameters can produce large changes in incentive strengths.

We distinguish between horizontal and vertical joint ventures, and find correspondingly different valuation effects. Horizontal joint ventures create synergistic gains that are shared by the partners. In contrast, vertical joint ventures generate gains only for suppliers. This is similar to the patter we find for simple contracts, which suggests economic similiarities between vertical joint ventures and contracts. Analysing firms' choices between these contracting options, we find that firms choose vertical joint ventures over simple contracts when potential hold-up problems are severe and when suppliers face finance constraints. The results d not support a risk-sharing motive for joint ventures.