We examine the effect of pass-through entities embedded in corporate structures on tax avoidance, tax uncertainty, and tax noncompliance using unique, confidential tax return data that link corporations and pass-through entities together through Schedules K-1. We develop measures of the use of pass-through entities such as the number and “connectedness” of pass-throughs within the structure, the presence of loss pass-throughs or asymmetric allocations of such losses, and connections to entities external to the firm. We predict and find that these features are associated with lower effective tax rates, higher current-year additions to tax reserves, and larger amounts of proposed IRS audit adjustments, controlling for probability of audit selection. This large-sample evidence could help the IRS understand how pass-throughs affect compliance and financial statements users anticipate the tax effects related to entity structure.

Managers express growing concern over media coverage of corporate taxes, yet no large-sample empirical study examines this phenomenon. As a first step to fill this void, we identify factors associated with the likelihood and negative tone of media tax coverage and examine firms' tax avoidance behavior following media tax coverage. We find the likelihood of media tax coverage is greater for firms with GAAP effective tax rates below the top U.S. statutory rate of 35 percent and for firms with greater visibility. The degree of negative tone is increasing in cash tax avoidance and firm size. We also find evidence of more frequent and more negative tax coverage during economic recessions. We find no evidence that firms reduce their tax avoidance following media coverage. Although our analyses are subject to limitations, our results suggest the media may not have the same influence over corporate tax policy as other external stakeholders. JEL Classifications: H25; H26; H20; M41; G39. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the paper.

We study whether innovation box tax incentives, which reduce tax rates on innovation-related income, are associated with increased fixed asset investment and employment. Using a stacked cohort difference-in-differences design on an entropy-balanced sample of European multinationals, we find innovation box regimes are associated with higher levels of capital expenditures, relative to noninnovation box jurisdictions. We do not find discernible effects on total employment or total compensation. However, the data suggest that companies in innovation box countries have a more highly compensated workforce following innovation box implementation, particularly among patent-owning observations in countries with more restrictive innovation box regimes and greater tax benefits. Our study contributes to the literature on, and policy evaluation of, innovation box regimes by examining the extent to which these incentives result in tangible investment and employment and by identifying how different characteristics of innovation box regimes impact these outcomes.