This paper investigates the role of stakeholder preference on corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies. Using a staggered difference-in-difference approach, we show that Indian firms increase CSR expenses when trade restrictions (Antidumping) are initiated against competing Chinese exports from countries with a high stakeholder preference for CSR. However, when these shocks emanate from countries with a lower stakeholder preference, CSR expenses remain unchanged. Capital expenditure and R&D of Indian firms increase following AD shocks, irrespective of their country of origin. Finally, CSR increases firm value only when the demand shocks originate from countries with a higher CSR preference. Collectively, we provide evidence for consumer-driven CSR strategies.

We develop a dynamic model of a firm in which cash management is partially delegated to a self-interested manager. Shareholders trade off the cost of dismissing the manager with the cost of managerial discretion over the use of liquid funds. An improvement in corporate governance quality may have a positive or a negative effect on levels and values of cash balances, depending on the source of the improvement. While a reduction of managerial entrenchment results in lower cash balances and mostly higher marginal cash values, we demonstrate that the opposite is true when the monitoring of managerial actions becomes more effective. A managerial asset substitution problem produces a novel hump-shaped relation between the firm's liquidity levels and the collective propensity of shareholders and managers to reduce cash flow risk. We also discuss the firm's risk management strategies as well as derive implications of the presence of an investment opportunity, debt financing, and shareholder activism.