We provide evidence that investors with leverage constraints demand leverage for the sake of leverage. We study the equity closed-end fund (CEF) market and document a strong positive relation between fund leverage and CEF premiums, indicating that investors pay a relative premium for leverage. We perform a quasi-natural experiment and identify leverage as a causal driver of the premium. Leverage changes do not signal improved fund performance. Instead, the only benefit to investors of increased leverage is amplified exposure via greater volatility and risk exposure. We supply external validity by relating our results to the betting-against-beta factor.

We analyze a setting in which a board must hire a chief executive officer (CEO) after exerting effort to learn about the quality of each candidate. Optimal effort is asymmetric, implying asymmetric likelihoods of each candidate being chosen. If the board has an infinitesimal bias in favor of one candidate, it allocates effort to maximize the likelihood of that candidate being chosen. Even when the board's prior is that its preferred candidate is inferior, she may still be chosen most often. A glass ceiling can also arise whereby the tendency to hire favored candidates increases as the importance of the position increases.