Private information models of strikes suggest that the strike is used as an information-revealing device by the union in the presence of asymmetrical information. A testable prediction of these models is that there is a negative relationship between strikes and the unpredicted component of the wage. This paper shows that in a large sample of U.S. labor contracts the real wage falls by about 3 percent after a strike lasting 100 days.

This paper examines the impact of collective-bargaining legislation on dispute costs and wages using a panel of Canadian public-sector contracts. Our results suggest that policymakers designing collective-bargaining legislation face a trade-off between reducing dispute costs and increasing wages. Dispute costs are lower under compulsory arbitration than under the right to strike or when no collective-bargaining legislation exists. Hence, a switch to compulsory arbitration could potentially make both the union and the employer better off by reducing dispute costs. However, we find that wages are higher under compulsory arbitration than under other legal structures.

Bargaining models suggest that firm-specific variables play an important role in wage determination. Yet previous empirical studies of wage determination have largely ignored these variables. Our analysis of a large panel data set of U.S. wage contracts suggests that firm-specific variables suggested by bargaining models. such as the values of sales. the capital-labor ratio, and the financial liquidity of the firm. are important determinants of negotiated real wages.

This paper examines the impact of collective-bargaining legislation on dispute costs and wages using a panel of Canadian public-sector contracts. The authors' results suggest that policymakers designing collective-bargaining legislation face a trade-off between reducing dispute costs and increasing wages. Dispute costs are lower under compulsory arbitration than under the right to strike or when no collective-bargaining legislation exists. Hence, a switch to compulsory arbitration could potentially make both the union and the employer better off by reducing dispute costs. However, the authors find that wages are higher under compulsory arbitration than under other legal structures.

This paper presents findings from an experimental evaluation of Job Corps, the nation's largest training program for disadvantaged youths. The study uses survey data collected over four years and tax data over nine years on a nationwide sample of 15,400 treatments and controls. The Job Corps model has promise; program participation increases educational attainment, reduces criminal activity, and increases earnings for several postprogram years. Based on tax data, however, the earnings gains were not sustained except for the oldest participants. Nonetheless, Job Corps is the only federal training program that has been shown to increase earnings for this population.