Investment funds that claim to focus on socially responsible stocks have proliferated in recent times. In this paper, we verify whether ESG mutual funds actually invest in firms that have stakeholder-friendly track records. Using a comprehensive sample of self-labelled ESG mutual funds (as identified by Morningstar) in the United States from 2010 to 2018, we find that these funds hold portfolio firms with worse track records for compliance with labor and environmental laws, relative to portfolio firms held by non-ESG funds managed by the same financial institutions in the same years. Relative to other funds offered by the same asset managers in the same years, ESG funds hold stocks that are more likely to voluntarily disclose carbon emissions performance but also stocks with higher carbon emissions per unit of revenue. Despite these findings, ESG funds hold portfolio firms with higher average ESG scores. We show that ESG scores are correlated with the quantity of voluntary ESG-related disclosures but not with firms’ compliance records or actual levels of carbon emissions. Finally, ESG funds appear to underperform financially relative to other funds within the same asset manager and year, and to charge higher fees. Our findings suggest that socially responsible funds do not appear to follow through on proclamations of concerns for stakeholders.

Campbell et al. (2001) document that firms’ stock returns have become more volatile in the U.S. since 1960. We hypothesize and find that deteriorating earnings quality is associated with higher idiosyncratic return volatility over 1962–2001. These results are robust to controlling for (i) inter-temporal changes in the disclosure of value-relevant information, sophistication of investors and the possibility that earnings quality can be informative about future cash flows; (ii) stock return performance, cash flow operating performance, cash flow variability, growth, leverage and firm size; and (iii) new listings, high-technology firms, firm-years with losses, mergers and acquisitions and financial distress.

Recent frauds have questioned the efficacy of the SEC's enforcement program. We hypothesize that differences in firms' information sets about SEC enforcement and constraints facing the SEC affect firms' proclivity to adopt aggressive accounting practices. We find that firms located closer to the SEC and in areas with greater past SEC enforcement activity, both proxies for firms' information about SEC enforcement, are less likely to restate their financial statements. Consistent with the resource-constrained SEC view, the SEC is more likely to investigate firms located closer to its offices. Our results suggest that regulation is most effective when it is local.

Several recent papers assume that private information (PIN), proposed by Easley et al. [2002. Is information risk a determinant of asset returns? Journal of Finance 57, 2185–2221; 2004. Factoring information into returns. Working Paper, Cornell University], is a determinant of stock returns. We replicate Easley et al. (2002) and show that while PIN does predict future returns in the sample they analyze, the effect is not robust to alternative specifications and time periods. There is no evidence that PIN factor loadings predict returns or that PIN factor returns reflect future GDP growth. PIN exhibits no association with implied cost of capital derived from analysts’ earnings forecasts. Overall, our findings cast doubt on whether PIN reflects information risk systematically priced by investors.

We introduce CRISK, a financial statement–based measure, to assess the systemic risk contribution of a financial firm. CRISK measures the capital shortfall of a financial firm conditional on severe distress in the entire system. Our measure complements the market‐based measure, SRISK, introduced by Acharya et al. (2012, American Economic Review , 102 (3), 59–64) and Brownlees and Engle (2017, Review of Financial Studies , 30 (1), 48–79), in identifying systemically risky financial firms. While SRISK provides a timelier assessment using real‐time stock market data, CRISK offers a more nuanced approach using accounting information and is tailored to the distinct characteristics of insurance firms and commercial banks. Our empirical analysis shows that (1) compared to CRISK, SRISK tends to overestimate capital shortfalls for insurance firms and for banks that hold a substantial portion of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation–insured deposits while underestimating capital shortfalls for banks heavily reliant on uninsured deposits; (2) CRISK estimates of capital shortfall closely align with the actual capital injections received by financial firms during the financial crisis of 2007–2009; and (3) CRISK exhibits a significant positive correlation with short interest. Based on our findings, we recommend using SRISK as an initial screening tool to identify potential systemically risky financial firms, followed by refining the list and validating the expected capital shortfall using CRISK.

We find that fixed effects related to the location of firms’ headquarters explain variation in broad based option grants after controlling for industry effects and firm characteristics traditionally known to affect option granting. Location matters because of local labor market conditions and social interaction with neighboring firms. Broad based option grants are higher: (i) when a firm's stock prices co-move more with stock prices of other firms located in that Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA); (ii) in states that are less likely to enforce non-compete agreements; and (iii) in MSAs where employees prefer options because stocks there experience abnormally high returns.

We survey and interview more than 400 executives to determine the factors that drive reported earnings and disclosure decisions. We find that managers would rather take economic actions that could have negative long-term consequences than make within-GAAP accounting choices to manage earnings. A surprising 78% of our sample admits to sacrificing long-term value to smooth earnings. Managers also work to maintain predictability in earnings and financial disclosures. We also find that managers make voluntary disclosures to reduce information risk and boost stock price but at the same time, try to avoid setting disclosure precedents that will be difficult to maintain.

Before directly addressing the Response to critique and further elaboration (hereafter “Comment”), written by Patrick Bolton and Marcin Kacperczyk (BK), a few thanks are in order. First, we thank the editor, Alex Edmans, both for providing BK the opportunity to directly comment on our paper as well as giving us the opportunity to respond. We believe that open intellectual debate is vital especially given the topic at hand. Directly facilitating such a conversation in conjunction with the paper’s publication in RF seems to us a good way to showcase various perspectives with equal prominence. Second, we thank BK for taking up the offer to engage with us within this context. We believe direct engagement is the best way to advance scholarly debate on whether and how investors consider carbon emissions information. In what follows, we write our rejoinder to BK’s Comment in the format of a response memo, that is, we reproduce BK’s main points (with some paraphrasing) and respond to each individually in turn. We believe this is the clearest—and, importantly, most parsimonious—way to provide our thoughts.