We examine whether executive stock options (ESOs) provide managers with incentives to invest in risky projects. For a sample of oil and gas producers, we examine whether the coefficient of variation of future cash flows from exploration activity (our proxy for exploration risk) increases with the sensitivity of the value of the CEO's options to stock return volatility (ESO risk incentives). Both ESO risk incentives and exploration risk are treated as endogenous variables by adopting a simultaneous equations approach. We find evidence that ESO risk incentives has a positive relation with future exploration risk taking. Additional tests indicate that ESO risk incentives exhibits a negative relation with oil price hedging in a system of equations where ESO risk incentives and hedging are allowed to be endogenously determined. Overall, our results are consistent with ESOs providing managers with incentives to mitigate risk-related incentive problems.

Articles in the financial press suggest that institutional investors are overly focused on current profitability. This suggests that as institutional ownership increases, stock prices will reflect less current period information that is predictive of future period earnings. On the other hand, institutional investors are often characterized in academic research as sophisticated investors. Sophisticated investors should be better able to utilize current period information to predict future earnings compared to other owners. According to this characterization, as institutional ownership increases, stock prices should reflect more current period information that is predictive of future period earnings. Consistent with this latter view, we find that the extent to which stock prices lead earnings is positively related to the percentage of institutional ownership. This result holds after controlling for various factors that affect the relation between price and earnings. It also holds when we control for endogenous portfolio choices of institutions (e.g., institutional investors may be attracted to firms in richer information environments where stock prices tend to lead earnings). Further, a regression of stock returns on order backlog, conditional on the percentage of institutional ownership, indicates that institutional owners place more weight on order backlog compared to other owners. This is consistent with institutional owners using non-earnings information to predict future earnings. It also explains, in part, why prices lead earnings to a greater extent when there is a higher concentration of institutional owners.

Articles in the financial press suggest that institutional investors are overly focused on current profitability, which suggests that as institutional ownership increases, stock prices reflect less current period information that is predictive of future period earnings. On the other hand, institutional investors are often characterized in academic research as sophisticated investors and sophisticated investors should be better able to use current‐period information to predict future earnings compared with other owners. According to this characterization, as institutional ownership increases, stock prices should reflect more current‐period information that is predictive of future period earnings. Consistent with this latter view, we find that the extent to which stock prices lead earnings is positively related to the percentage of institutional ownership. This result holds after controlling for various factors that affect the relation between price and earnings. It also holds when we control for endogenous portfolio choices of institutions (e.g., institutional investors may be attracted to firms in richer information environments where stock prices tend to lead earnings). Further, a regression of stock returns on order backlog, conditional on the percentage of institutional ownership, indicates that institutional owners place more weight on order backlog compared with other owners. This result is consistent with institutional owners using non‐earnings information to predict future earnings. It also explains, in part, why prices lead earnings to a greater extent when there is a higher concentration of institutional owners.

This research investigates whether oil and gas producing firms use abnormal accruals and hedging with derivatives as substitutes to manage earnings volatility. Firms engaged in oil exploration and drilling are exposed to two kinds of risks that can cause earnings volatility: oil price risk and exploration risk. Firms can use abnormal accrual choices and/or derivatives to reduce earnings volatility caused by oil price risk, but cannot directly hedge the operational risk of unsuccessful drilling. Because hedging and using abnormal accruals are costly activities, and because prior research suggests managers do not eliminate all volatility (Haushalter 2000; Barton 2001), we expect that, at the margin, managers will use these smoothing mechanisms as substitutes to manage earnings volatility. Our results suggest a sequential process whereby managers of oil and gas producing firms first determine the extent to which they will use derivatives to hedge oil price risk, and then, especially in the fourth quarter, manage residual earnings volatility by trading off abnormal accruals and hedging with derivatives to smooth income.

In this study we investigate the valuation implications of managerial actions undertaken by 57 Internet firms engaged in Business‐to‐Business (B2B) e‐commerce. We classify 3,007 managerial actions undertaken by our sample firms between the firm’s IPO date and September 30, 2000 into nine action categories: (1) acquisition of major customers, (2) introduction of new products and services, (3) promotional and marketing actions, (4) actions taken to address the concerns of stakeholders such as employees and the community at large, (5) announcements of technology, marketing, and distribution alliances, (6) completion of acquisitions, (7) expansion into international markets, (8) management team building actions, and (9) organizational changes. In the short window tests, we find a significant increase in stock price volatility over a three‐day event window surrounding the announcement of almost all actions suggesting that announcement of managerial actions provides value‐relevant information to the stock market. In the long window tests, we use factor analysis to group the counts of managerial actions taken by each firm over its post‐IPO life into two broad managerial initiatives—market penetration and organization building. These two initiatives explain a substantial portion of the cross‐sectional variation in the firms’ post‐IPO life stock market returns beyond that explained by both reported earnings and analysts’ forecasts of future earnings and revenues. Thus, investors appear to supplement relatively meager accounting information with data about the cross‐sectional intensity of managerial actions in setting stock prices of B2B Internet firms.

The financial press and accounting regulators (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and Financial Accounting Standards Board) have expressed concern about pressures on Internet firms to report high levels of revenue. This study verifies the association between market capitalization and revenue, and examines economic factors that potentially influence Internet company managers' decisions to adopt allegedly aggressive revenue‐recognition policies. Specifically, we examine factors hypothesized to influence the reporting of advertising barter revenue and grossed‐up sales levels. We begin by providing descriptive evidence on the use of barter and grossed‐up revenue across Internet sectors. Although common in some sectors, we find that the use of these accounting policies is not pervasive overall. We limit our empirical analyses to Internet companies that have the opportunity to report grossed‐up or advertising barter revenue. Our cross‐sectional predictions are based on both external and internal incentives to maximize revenues as well as constraints that may limit management's discretion. We predict that the following factors increase the likelihood that a firm will report grossed‐up and/or barter revenue: shorter time before needing additional external financing, more active individual investor interest in the firm's stock, more active pursuit of growth via acquisitions, and greater use of stock options in employee compensation. We also posit that barter transactions might be an inexpensive way for firms to evaluate the viability of future marketing or content alliances with potential partners. Finally, we predict that constraints on management discretion are related to the reputation/quality of the firm's auditor and underwriter and the extent of management ownership. We find that firms with greater cash burn rates and higher levels of activity on Motley Fool message boards are consistently associated with barter and grossed‐up revenue reporting.