We estimate the relation between stock option (ESO) grants to the top five executives and future earnings to examine whether incentive alignment or rent extraction by top managers explains option granting behavior. The future operating income associated with a dollar of Black-Scholes value of an ESO grant is $3.71. To understand the source of these positive payoffs, we parse out ESO grant values into components predicted by economic determinants of option grants, governance quality, and a residual grant value. The payoffs to ESOs appear to be driven predominantly by the economic determinants of option grants and not poor governance quality.

We show that network advantages constitute an important intangible asset that goes unrecognized in the financial statements. For a sample of e–commerce firms, we find that network advantages created by Web site traffic have substantial explanatory power for stock prices over and above traditional summary accounting measures such as earnings and book value of equity. Also, network advantages are positively associated with one–year–ahead and two–year–ahead earnings forecasts provided by equity analysts. When we allow network advantages to be endogenously determined by managerial actions, we find that at least part of the value relevance of network effects stems from the presence of affiliate referral programs and higher media visibility.