This paper studies expected loan loss and adverse selection in private mortgage securitization . The research extends the previous literature on securitization that has focused on default probability. Expected loan loss incorporates both the probability of default and loss given default and represents a comprehensive measure of loan quality that has the ultimate impact on lenders and investors. This new measure of loan quality reverses some of the findings in the previous literature. The disparity in results between the alternative measures is more pronounced among loans with higher expected loss given default. Our results provide new evidence of adverse selection in prime loans. This cherry-picking behavior does not hold for subprime loans.

This paper provides empirical evidence that a strong statutory right of redemption leads to a statistically significant and an economically large impact in reducing bankruptcy filings. Under the statutory right of redemption, borrowers can repurchase the property after the foreclosure auction at a certain price. Implementations of the statutory right of redemption, however, vary substantially among states. When categorizing the redemption rights from an economic perspective, we find that a strong redemption right leads to a greater than 30% decrease in the odds that a borrower with a defaulted mortgage will file for bankruptcy.