We find robust empirical evidence that firms in locations with higher exposure to climate change pay significantly higher spreads on their bank loans. To alleviate the concerns related to using firms' headquarters in determining climate risk exposure, we exploit the economic link between a firm and its customers and find that the exposure of a firm's customers to climate risk also adversely affects that firm's cost of borrowing. In the cross-section, we find that the long-term loans of poorly rated firms drive the effect. Overall, our evidence suggests that lenders increasingly view climate change as a relevant risk factor.

We find that Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) actions (especially rate cuts) narrowed corporate credit spreads during the pre-crisis period of 2002–07. During the 2008 crisis period, we find that both conventional cuts and quantitative easing decreased spreads. But FOMC inactions caused significant widening of spreads. The effects are especially large for speculative-grade and short-maturity bonds. Overall, the policy uncertainty during the crisis and macroeconomic theories during the pre-crisis period help to explain why FOMC announcements impacted credit spreads. The Fed’s actions targeted at promoting growth and/or providing systemic liquidity were especially noted by the corporate bond market.

We study the impact of stronger shareholder control on bondholders. We find that the passage of shareholder-sponsored governance proposals causes a decline in credit default swap spreads, indicating a net positive effect on bondholders. Evidence suggests that the direct benefit of stronger shareholder control, through the “management disciplining” channel, is larger than the combined adverse effects of directly escalating shareholder-bondholder conflict and indirectly exacerbating exposure to shareholder opportunism. Results are stronger for firms with existing high levels of shareholder-bondholder conflict and for proposals that mitigate managerial entrenchment without exacerbating risk-shifting. Finally, stronger shareholder control improves credit ratings and operating performance in the long-term.

Using a sample of 27 countries between 1990 and 2014, we find that banks charge higher interest rates and adjust other contractual features of their loans when lending to firms facing more stringent environmental regulations. Our evidence suggests that lenders’ concerns about the increase in environmental liabilities resulting from regulations is driving the results. Specifically, we show that firms facing such regulations have fewer participants in their loan syndicates, higher bankruptcy risk, and lower credit ratings, despite reducing their leverage. Overall, our results indicate that the observed higher loan spread is the result of environmentally sensitive lending practices by banks.

Using a news-based index of geopolitical risk (GPR) and over 62 years of data, we find that GPR has a long-lasting negative impact on leverage. Our result is robust to different model specifications, different proxies for leverage, a battery of robustness tests, and survives after addressing endogeneity concerns. Further, we provide evidence that the effect is channeled through declining shifts in both the demand and supply of credit. Cross-sectional tests indicate that the effect is stronger for firms with higher existing leverage, those with more irreversible investment, and those whose stock returns are more sensitive to GPR. Overall, our analysis indicates that GPR is more important than other macro-level determinants of capital structure such as inflation, GDP growth, interest rate variables and other widely used measures of uncertainty.