This paper uses a dynamic partial equilibrium model to explain a puzzle of dividend smoothing. In contrast to the Modigliani–Miller theory, I show that firm value depends on payout policy. The analysis implies that firms with more stable dividend stream are more valuable. This explains why dividends are rigid over time. A volatile component of dividends is introduced to reduce the likelihood of dividend omission in bad times while keeping the same historical average dividends. I show that the empirically observed positive relation between dividends and future firm performance is a statistical artifact driven by dividend smoothing. Thus, the empirical tests of dividend signaling theory might be misspecified.

This paper revisits the Modigliani–Miller propositions on the optimal financing policy and cost of capital in a dynamic setting. In an environment without taxes and bankruptcy costs, the results are generally consistent with the Modigliani–Miller Propositions 1 and 2. However, the first proposition should be presented and interpreted more carefully, as given firm characteristics, there is only one optimal capital structure. Thus, a firm’s capital structure is relevant. A relaxation of assumptions about either taxes or bankruptcy costs leads to conclusions that are generally different from those in Modigliani and Miller (1958). The model predicts that leverage and sales-to-capital ratios decrease but firm size and capital stock increase with the subjective discount factor of the firm’s manager if there are taxes and bankruptcy costs. The empirical analysis supports these predictions.

Using a two-firm dynamic model, we investigate whether firms’ corporate policies are impacted by the peers’ idiosyncratic technology shocks. A firm hit by the positive idiosyncratic technology shock becomes more productive. Thus, it is better off. As a result, its Cournot competitor is worse off. Therefore, their optimal decisions are opposite to each other, leading to negative correlations between corporate policies across the firms. The empirical analysis using the idiosyncratic technology shocks and, to a lesser extent, CEO sudden deaths supports this prediction. Our analysis suggests that mimicking peers who alter their corporate policies due to idiosyncratic technology shocks destroys shareholder value.

In this paper, we analyze the role of hiring a reputable compensation consultant for firms wanting to secure affirmative Say on Pay (SoP) votes. We provide evidence that reputation influences shareholders voting behavior positively when CEO pay is excessive and when peer CEOs are paid less. We employ two methods to account for endogeneity, instrumental variables as well as examining firms switching up to more reputable compensation consultants. Our results are robust with respect to CEO pay and complexity as well as fees and alternate measures of reputation. Firms concerned with the negative feedback associated with negative SoP votes should factor reputation in their decision to hire consultants, especially if trying to adopt compensation packages that may appear excessive.

This paper investigates whether employee stock option proceeds, both executive and non-executive are employed by firms to finance investment by exploiting a quasi-natural experiment which mandated option expensing, SFAS 123R. We find that despite a fall in both executive and non-executive option grants and proceeds, investment has increased post-SFAS 123R. The investment's sensitivity to option proceeds remains constant or even decreases for non-executive option proceeds post-SFAS 123R implying that option proceeds are not an integral source of finance. Our results are not driven by the recent financial crisis as well as the changes in corporate governance and financial constraints over the sample period.

This study analyzes whether corporate financing policies of the US industrial firms have depended on borrowing costs during the last forty years. The results show that the impact is either zero or slightly negative. Even in the latter case, the results are economically insignificant. Overall, our findings suggest that firms do not adjust their capital structures based on interest rates, except when market participants expect that real gross domestic product growth will be negative. Using a dynamic partial equilibrium model, we show that relatively high leverage adjustment costs are able to explain the weak negative relation between interest rates and a firm's leverage. Our results are also consistent with the view that firms target debt-to-asset ratio rather than debt level.

This paper provides a theoretical explanation for how risk preferences of a firm’s manager impact a firm’s optimal financing policy and shareholder value. The developed model implies that firms in growing industries are more valuable if they are run by more risk-seeking managers. Similarly, firms operating in declining industries should be run by less risk-seeking managers. Given that a firm’s optimal assets do not depend on the growth opportunities, and that debt is the difference between assets and equity, the model implies that there is a negative (positive) correlation between the riskiness of CEOs’ compensation packages and firms’ financial leverage ratios for firms in growing (declining) industries. This prediction is in stark contrast to economic intuition and prior literature in that less risk aversion normally should increase risk-taking. The empirical analysis generally supports all the model’s implications except those related to firms operating in declining industries.

This study investigates whether gender pay inequality in the top management team, measured by gender pay slice (GPS), is a factor in Say on Pay (SoP) voting as required by the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. Since CEOs are known to play a distinct role in SoP voting, we treat CEOs separately and define GPS as the fraction of total non-CEO executive compensation captured by females. Controlling for numerous factors including CEO pay and CEO gender, ISS recommendations, pay composition, firm performance, and other firm characteristics, we find robust evidence of a negative relation between non-CEO GPS and SoP votes, but this gender-based difference in SoP voting does not extend to the CEO. Taken together, our findings imply that gender equality in terms of SoP voting is still an issue for female executives at the sub-top level.

We compare the motivations for switching underwriters between seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) for both shelf offerings and traditional offerings. Shelf offerings have risen in importance and accounted for more than 90% of SEOs in 2015. In traditional offerings, the underwriter is selected before the terms and pricing of the deal are set. In contrast, shelf issuers request proposals or bids from underwriters for the sale of securities and the underwriter is selected based on the pricing, terms and services offered in the bid. The competitive and transactional nature of the shelf registered market may reduce switching costs for the issuer and potentially increases the issuer's bargaining power. This suggests that underwriter switching in shelf offerings might have different, heretofore unexplored, drivers from traditional offerings. The results suggest that cost-considerations motivate switching in shelf offerings whereas underwriter reputation motivates switching in traditional offerings. However, changes in underwriter reputation can themselves be associated with changes in cost. Cost considerations also impact switching from traditional offerings to shelf offerings.